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ABSTRACT 
THEORY OF MIND, SOCIAL FUNCTIONING, AND AWARENESS OF ABILITY IN 
OLDER ADULTS 
Sarah Vedrody Rowe 
December 16, 2011 
Declines in social resources and in the quality of interpersonal interactions have 
been observed in some older adults. Unawareness of ability is a clinical problem that has 
been found in some older adults with dementia, but has also been found in nondemented 
older adults, and the clinical correlates have not been reliably established. Theory of 
mind (ToM) is a social-cognitive construct that refers to the ability to infer the mental 
states of others and the self. ToM has been linked with social functioning and self-
awareness, but few studies have examined these variables in older adults. The current 
study tested the hypotheses that lower levels of ToM ability would predict lower levels of 
social functioning and higher levels of unawareness of ability. 
Seventy-eight community dwelling older adults and their informants participated. 
Participants completed multiple measures of ToM, memory, executive functioning, social 
resources, social behaviors, and awareness of ability on different tasks. Correlations, t 
tests, chi-square and path analysis were used to test the hypotheses. Study results 
indicated the presence of impaired performance on ToM measures in the community-
dwelling sample, but relatively accurate awareness and strong social functioning across 
measures. Despite the presence of impaired performance on ToM, ToM did not predict 
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any of the social relations variables. The results of the ToM and awareness analyses were 
mixed, with one association that approached significance in the predicted direction and 
other significant associations that were in the opposite direction. 
The results suggest that ToM may not be a valid construct for predicting social 
functioning in community-dwelling older adults. ToM may have been confounded with 
general cognitive processes, indicating that the demonstrated impairment was not ToM-
specific. An underlying neurological process also may have been detected by the ToM 
tests that has not yet impacted social relations or awareness. Improvement in the 
measurement of the three constructs, continued research into the correlates of awareness 
and social relations, and longitudinal study in community-dwelling older adults, will help 
clarify the relationship, if any, between the three constructs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the present study was to explore the relationships between theory 
of mind (ToM), social relations in older adults, and the clinical problem of lack of 
awareness of performance deficits in dementia and mild cognitive impairment. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that theory of mind measures may be useful in 
predicting problematic social relations in older adults as well as a lack of awareness of 
cognitive and behavioral deficits associated with dementing disorders. In order to 
establish the basis for positing links between these three constructs, relevant background 
information on each construct and its importance to successful aging will be discussed in 
the following sections. The last section of the introduction will introduce hypotheses 
generated from the literature review. 
Social Relations 
Social resources are instrumental to successful aging, and support from others 
through social interactions is theorized to provide a buffer for the stresses of daily life 
(see reviews, Bath & Deeg, 2005; Cohen et aI., 2001; Antonucci, 2001). Social networks 
and social support are two types of social resources (Antonucci, 2001; Barnes et aI., 
2004b). Larger social networks have been associated with better health (Berkman & 
Syme, 1979) and may provide increased opportunities for social support and participation 
in social activities (Berkman & Syme, 1979; Berkman et aI., 2000; Bath & Deeg, 2005; 
Gurung et aI., 2003). Greater levels of social support have been associated with better 
physical and mental health, lower levels of cognitive decline over time, lower levels of 
frailty, lower levels of depression and suicidal ideation and decreased risk for mortality in 
studies of older adults (DuPertuis et ai., 2001; Beland et ai., 2005; Barnes et ai., 2004a; 
Woo et aI., 2005; Vanderhorst & McLaren, 2005; Hsu, 2007). Additionally, in older 
adults with dementia, those with greater social support demonstrated reduced levels of 
mortality (Orrell et aI., 2000). 
Older adults tend to limit their contact to close friends and family members (Field 
& Minkler, 1988), and their social networks may diminish as they allocate their resources 
to these smaller networks of more intimate relationships (Field & Minkler, 1988; Lang & 
Carstensen, 1994; Carstensen et aI., 1999). As a group, older adults also decrease the 
frequency of their contact with their network members (Carstensen, 1992). 
Socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) predicts that as individuals grow older, their 
motivations for socialization with others may shift from information-seeking or 
achievement-oriented goals to emotionally-rewarding goals (Lang & Carstensen, 1994). 
SST proposes that the shift in motivation for socialization occurs as individuals become 
increasingly aware of their limited time left to live (Lang & Carstensen, 1994). As a 
result of this shift toward more emotionally-rewarding relationships, older adults 
consciously and proactively select out of relationships that are less emotionally 
satisfying. Similarly, the Social Convoy Model posits that individuals may change the 
structure of and members in their networks, but they seek to maintain consistent levels of 
social support across their lifetimes (Kahn & Antonucci, 1980). The Social Convoy 
Model suggests that as individuals age they become more adept at identifying and 
maximizing relationships with supportive network members and more likely to discard 
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unsupportive network members, which results in smaller networks (Kahn & Antonucci, 
1980). 
While larger network sizes may increase opportunities to receive social support, 
the subjective well-being of older adults has demonstrated greater association with the 
quality of their relationships as opposed to the quantity of their relationships (Pinquart & 
Sorensen, 2000). Social support is often divided between instrumental and perceived 
social support. Instrumental social support reflects receipt of help from others in carrying 
out daily activities or providing material resources, while perceived social support 
measures individuals' subjective appraisals of how well they are supported by those 
around them (Sarason et aI., 1987). The quality of relationships is typically determined 
by assessments of how well older adults perceive that they are supported (Sarason et aI., 
1987). While both instrumental and perceived social support are important, perceived 
social support has demonstrated the greatest ability to predict overall well-being, which 
has in tum, been associated with better health outcomes (Cohen et aI., 1985; Cohen et aI., 
2001). 
The subjective nature of perceived social support highlights the importance of the 
quality of the interaction between individuals and members of their networks. In other 
words, whether individuals perceive themselves as being supported by their network 
members may depend on the types of interpersonal interactions that they have with them. 
Reis, Clark and Holmes (2004) have linked perceived support with the responsiveness of 
the individual providing support to the needs of the recipient. Studies examining the 
frequency of positive and negative social exchanges have also emphasized the 
contribution of interpersonal interactions to well-being. In a longitudinal study utilizing 
daily diaries that captured the number of positive and negative social interactions that 
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older adults experienced, higher levels of negative social interactions were associated 
with a lack of well-being and depression (Rook, 2001). In this study, negative social 
interactions also appeared to mitigate the impact of positive interactions on mood. 
Another study found that negative social exchanges seem to have longer-lasting effects 
on both positive and negative affect (Newsom et ai., 2003). In yet another study, older 
men who reported that the people close to them were too demanding and older women 
who reported that individuals close to them were irritating, reported lower levels of 
happiness (Antonucci et ai., 1998). Perceived poorer quality support has also been 
associated with the decision to hasten death in terminally ill older adults (Schroepfer, 
2008). Collectively, these findings emphasize the importance of the quality of the 
interpersonal interaction between older adults and network members. 
Individual characteristics such as depression and cognitive impairment may make 
some older adults more likely to experience negative social exchanges. A large 
longitudinal study found that older adults who were depressed or cognitively-impaired at 
baseline reported more negative interpersonal interactions with members of their network 
approximately two years later (Gurung et ai., 2003). Older adults' exposure to negative 
social exchanges has also been associated with less supportive networks and greater life 
stress, and decreases in exposure to negative social exchanges over time have been 
associated with satisfaction with friend relationships (Rook, 2003). Notably, increases in 
the exposure to negative exchanges has been associated with increases in total support 
(including instrumental support) provided by the network (Rook, 2003). The positive 
correlation between negative social exchanges and total support may be explained by 
individuals needing increased emotional and instrumental support due to declines in 
cognition or daily functioning, such as declines in basic activities of daily living (ADLs) 
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or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). In essence, changes in function may 
alter the number or content of social exchanges with network members. In such cases, 
the support provided to individuals may be inadequate or may not match their support 
needs. Negative social exchanges may result from this mismatch, as individuals needing 
support become frustrated with their support networks and network members adapt, with 
varying levels of success, their behavior to meet the needs of their loved ones. Thus, 
changes in function may increase older adults' exposure to negative social exchanges. 
Increases in negative social exchanges may also b.e explained by increases in 
inappropriate social behaviors displayed by some older adults. Inappropriate social 
behaviors that have demonstrated greater frequencies in older adults compared to 
younger adults include higher levels of off-target verbosity, discussion of private events 
in public settings, and prejudicial and stereotyping behavior (Henry et aI., 2009; Pushkar 
et aI., 2000; von Hippel et aI., 2000; von Hippel & Dunlop, 2005). Henry et ai. (2009) 
have found that the relationship between age and social inappropriateness is mediated by 
executive functioning, though this model only partially explains the variance in social 
appropriateness. This finding is particularly important because executive functioning has 
been linked with frontal lobe integrity, which may be linked with social functioning 
(Stuss & Levine, 2002). 
Additional evidence for the importance of the frontal lobes to social functioning 
comes from illnesses that damage frontal lobe structures. The frontal variant 
frontotemporal dementia (fvFTD), which initially affects the orbitofrontal and 
ventromedial areas of the prefrontal cortex, provides an extreme example of how 
dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex can affect social behavior. Patients with fvFTD 
initially present with severe deficits in social functioning that include "breaches of 
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interpersonal etiquette, tactlessness, and disinhibition," (Snowden et aI., 2002 p. 140; 
see also Neary et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 1999; Lough & Hodges, 2002; Bozeat et aI., 
2000). 
In nonnal aging, cognitive functions associated with the prefrontal cortex decline 
first (West, 1996; Raz & Rodrigue, 2006) and may explain changes associated with social 
behavior. The end ofthe lifespan is widely recognized as a time ofloss in multiple 
domains, but it is also characterized by variability in these losses across individuals. 
Aging demonstrates differential effects across the brains of individuals due to diseases of 
age, cardiovascular diseases, metabolic disorders, etc. (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006). While 
nonnal aging may not involve the pervasive deterioration in frontal lobe integrity seen in 
fvFTD, many nonnally aging individuals may experience relative loss of various frontal 
functions which may, in tum, affect their social behavior (Henry et aI., 2009). 
Theory of Mind 
Social-cognitive constructs, such as empathy and morality, are hypothesized to be 
recruited by the cognitive system for the processing of social stimuli; they enable humans 
to make sense of the social world and interact productively with others (Washburn et aI., 
2003). Theory of mind (ToM) is a social-cognitive construct that may account for 
variability in social functioning in older adults, particularly those in the early stages of 
dementia. ToM concerns the ability to attribute mental states to the self and others in 
order to explain and predict behavior (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Frith & Frith, 1999). 
ToM involves an awareness that others may have thoughts, beliefs, emotions, or 
intentions that are different from one's own (Frith & Frith, 1999). Knowledge of others' 
mental states can be used to effectively adapt one's own behavior to achieve desired 
outcomes. ToM, or the ability to "mentalize" or "mind-read," has been associated with 
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evolutionary advantages, as mind-reading abilities would allow human beings to better 
adapt to social complexities (Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006). ToM reliably emerges in 
healthy children across different cultures around the age of four and develops throughout 
childhood, and ToM may represent an important resource for social relations (Perner & 
Wimmer, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Liu et aI., 2008). 
A premise of social cognitive measures is that such measures should be able to 
explain social functioning better than nonsocial cognitive measures, such as those used in 
typical assessment batteries. ToM has been implicated in social functioning through 
studies with clinical populations that have marked social deficits. Individuals with 
autism, Asperger's syndrome, schizophrenia, traumatic brain injury, and dementia have 
all demonstrated deficits on tests of ToM (Baron-Cohen et at, 2001; Baron-Cohen et at, 
1985; Brune, 2005; Langdon et at, 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007; Gregory et aI., 2002; 
Happe et aI., 1998; Happe, 1994; Milders et aI., 2006). ToM abilities also predict social 
functioning in childhood, as children with ToM are more likely to initiate play and assign 
roles for pretend play than children without ToM (Astington & Jenkins, 1995). There 
have only been two studies that examined the direct relationship between ToM and social 
relations in older adults. While one study found that nurses ratings' of nursing home 
residents' social functioning were predicted by their performance on a ToM task 
(Washburn, 2003), the other study found no relationship between ToM and pro social 
behaviors in healthy older adults living in the community (Washburn et at, 2003; Bailey 
et at, 2008). 
Measures of ToM have demonstrated utility over traditional neuropsychological 
tests in differentiating individuals in the early stages of fvFTD from healthy older adults 
and from patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD; Gregory et at, 2002; Torralva et at, 
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2009). Patients with fvFTD may not initially demonstrate deficits on traditional 
neuropsychological tests, and imaging procedures may provide little assistance in 
diagnosing fvFTD in the initial stages (Gregory et aI., 2002; Neary et aI., 1998; Lough & 
Hodges, 2002; Bozeat et aI., 2000; Gregory et aI., 1999). Thus, the development and 
utilization of ToM measures could have considerable value in dementia assessment, and 
possibly in pre-dementia states. 
Lesion and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have primarily 
associated ToM with the prefrontal cortex, particularly the orbitofrontal and ventromedial 
areas, though other areas of prefrontal cortex, the limbic system, and the temporo-parietal 
junction appear to be important in carrying out ToM tasks as well (Gregory, 2002; 
Gallagher et aI., 2000; Rowe et aI., 2001; Baird et aI., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Stone 
et aI., 2003; Stuss et aI., 2001). Individuals with damage to these areas often demonstrate 
impairments on ToM tasks compared to healthy controls and display deficits in social 
functioning that include disruptive behaviors. For example, patients with orbitofrontal 
lobe lesions and patients with fvFTD have demonstrated significantly poorer performance 
compared to healthy controls in detecting social faux pas (Gregory et aI., 2002; Stone et 
aI., 1998). Additionally, ToM performance was significantly related to the amount of 
atrophy in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in patients with fvFTD, with individuals 
who had greater atrophy displaying poorer performance on ToM tasks (Gregory et aI., 
2002). 
ToM Measures 
Based on empirical evidence from clinical populations with developmental 
disabilities, Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (2000) have suggested that ToM has two 
components: a social-cognitive component and a social-perceptual component. The 
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social-perceptual component is hypothesized to be linked to the affective system and 
involves the processing of the social expressions of others, including their gestures, facial 
expressions, and vocal tone. The social-perceptual component of ToM is important for 
making rapid online judgments about others' mental states. The social-cognitive 
component involves the representational aspect of ToM and likely relies on both social 
and nonsocial cognitive processes; relevant nonsocial cognitive processes include 
language ability and working memory. While some ToM tests may emphasize the social-
perceptual component more than the social-cognitive component, the social-cognitive 
component is still necessary to perform well on social-perceptual ToM tasks due to the 
language or working memory demands on those tasks. Likewise, the social-cognitive 
component may be influenced by information gathered by the social-perceptual 
component. Developmentally, both components are theorized to continue developing 
throughout childhood (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). 
In children, tasks that measure the ability to comprehend false beliefs are the gold 
standard for assessing the social-cognitive component of ToM (Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000). Such ToM tasks are often embedded within a series of questions about 
a vignette. Vignettes, as well as non-verbal stimuli such as cartoons, are frequently used 
to test false beliefs, as well as the ability to infer the emotions, motivations, or intentions 
of the characters depicted in them. There are essentially two main kinds of false belief 
tasks: first-order false belief tasks and second-order false belief tasks. A first-order false 
belief task measures the ability to detect when someone has a belief that is different from 
one's own (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). An example of a first-order task involves 
presenting participants with a scenario such as, "Mary put a glass of water on the kitchen 
table and then she left the kitchen; after she left, John moved the glass of water to the 
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sink" (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). The ToM question in this example would be "Where 
does Mary think the water is?" At approximately the age of four, children pass first-order 
false belief tasks by correctly stating a character's false belief. However, normally 
developing children below the age of four usually respond that the glass is where they 
(the children being tested) believe it to be in reality (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). 
Participants are also asked questions to ascertain their factual understanding of the story, 
such as, "Where is the glass of water?" They are also asked questions testing their 
memory of the story content. The aim of these questions is to control for possible 
confounds and increase the specificity ofthe task for identifying ToM abilities. 
Second-order false belief tasks involve the ability to metarepresent the mental 
states of two people (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). Second-order false belief tasks present 
participants with a scenario similar to the first-order false belief task, but the scenario is 
modified. For example, the same scenario from the first-order false belief task could be 
used with the following addition: "Mary peeks back into the kitchen to see John move the 
glass without John noticing that Mary is spying on him" (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). The 
second-order ToM question for this scenario would be, "Where does John think that Mary 
thinks the glass is?" Children would not typically give the correct answer that John 
thinks that Mary thinks the glass is on the table until at least the age of seven (Pemer & 
Wimmer, 1985). 
The usefulness of false belief tasks (as described above) as a measure of ToM 
ability in older adults may be limited. First-order false belief tasks are often too easy for 
older adults, even those with Alzheimer's disease; the results of studies that have used 
first-order false belief tasks with older adults tend to demonstrate ceiling effects (Zaitchik 
et aI., 2004; Zaitchik et aI., 2006). Second-order false belieftasks rely heavily on 
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working memory, which often declines with age (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). 
Finally, some high-functioning patients in clinical populations who display social deficits 
have been able to pass traditional false belief tasks, indicating that false belief tasks may 
not be as sensitive to subtle deficits in social functioning (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1997; 
Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999; Happe, 1994). 
Advanced tests of ToM have been developed for adults and patients in clinical 
populations who can pass the false belief tasks described above but who still demonstrate 
social deficits compared to healthy controls (Gregory et aI., 2002; Baron-Cohen et aI., 
1999). Advanced ToM tests attempt to replicate the complexity of naturally occurring 
social situations in which ToM abilities must be employed. Two such tests are the Faux 
Pas Test and the Reading the Eyes in the Mind test (EYES; Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999; 
Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001; Stone et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 2002). For the Faux Pas 
Test, individuals are presented with vignettes in which a faux pas mayor may not have 
occurred. The test requires individuals to correctly detect when a faux pas has occurred, 
and it also assesses faux pas understanding. To succeed, older adults must metarepresent 
two mental states: the mental state of the character committing the faux pas and the 
mental state of the person who may be disturbed by the faux pas (Stone et aI., 1998). 
While the Faux Pas Test requires cultural knowledge, it also requires both affective and 
cognitive elements of ToM (Stone et aI., 1998). Although older adults are read the 
vignette by an examiner, working memory demands are reduced because older adults are 
allowed to refer to a written copy of the vignette as they answer questions (Gregory et aI., 
2002). With regard to clinical populations, the Faux Pas Test demonstrated the greatest 
sensitivity in detecting patients with fvFTD compared to other tests of ToM, and it has 
also demonstrated greater sensitivity than false belief tasks in detecting Asperger's 
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syndrome (Gregory et ai., 2002; Baron-Cohen et ai., 1999). Thus, the Faux Pas Test 
appears to be an advanced ToM measure that is extremely sensitive to deficits in social 
functioning in adults. 
EYES is a measure of higher-order ToM ability that was designed to tap the 
social-perceptual component of ToM (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1997; Baron-Cohen et ai., 
2001; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). It requires individuals to discern complex 
mental states just by viewing a picture of a pair of human eyes (Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000; Baron-Cohen et ai., 1997; Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001; Stone et ai., 1998). 
Participants are shown a picture of the eyes surrounded by four mental state words (i.e. 
grateful, bored, aghast, etc.) and instructed to choose "the word that best describes what 
the person in the picture is thinking or feeling" (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001). Like the 
Faux Pas Test, EYES demonstrates age differentiation in children and has successfully 
differentiated patients with Asperger's syndrome and fvFTD from healthy controls 
(Baron-Cohen et ai., 2001; Gregory et ai., 2002). Scores on EYES are also normally 
distributed among healthy controls, making it an excellent measure of ToM ability in 
older adults. 
While both EYES and the Faux Pas test are considered advanced ToM tests, they 
do not always correlate with one another. In patients with fvFTD, performance on EYES 
and the Faux Pas Test were significantly correlated in one study (Torralva et aI., 2007). 
In another study comparing patients with AD, fvFTD, and healthy controls, significant 
correlations were found between first-order false belief tasks, second-order false belief 
tasks, and the Faux Pas Test, although none of these measures correlated with EYES 
(Gregory et ai., 2002). Explanations for the lack of correlation between different ToM 
measures in some samples have included hypotheses that the tests were measuring 
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different aspects of ToM (i.e. social-cognitive vs. social-perceptual; visual vs. verbal; 
affective vs. cognitive) or findings that variance in some ToM tasks may be better 
explained by other cognitive processes (Gregory et aI., 2002; Saltzman et aI., 2000; 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Shamay-Tsoory & Haron-Peretz, 2007). 
Variability in performance accounted for by other cognitive processes is at the 
root of a debate regarding the existence of a dedicated ToM module because ToM 
abilities have been associated with language, attention, memory, and executive 
functioning; these cognitive abilities are believed to contribute to performance on ToM 
tasks, but may not fully explain ToM abilities (Milligan et aI., 2007). Evidence for the 
modularity of ToM has been found in studies demonstrating dissociations from other 
cognitive processes as well as studies in which ToM performance significantly 
distinguishes groups even after controlling for associated cognitive processes (Rowe et 
aI., 2001; Lough et aI., 2006). Because aging is characterized by average declines in a 
range of cognitive processes; including perceptual speed, spatial orientation, and verbal 
memory; deficits in cognitive processes could explain any deficits that older adults 
exhibit on ToM measures (Schaie, 1994). As the declines in cognitive functioning seen 
in patients with dementia are even more profound, studies of ToM in patients with 
dementia must control for associated cognitive processes in order to determine whether 
an individual has a specific impairment regarding inferring the mental states of others. 
For example, an individual in the mild stages of dementia may have great difficulty 
recalling a vignette and answering questions about it not because of a ToM deficit, but 
because of a working memory deficit. Control conditions and controlling for 
confounding variables within analyses are ways that researchers have attempted to isolate 
ToM performance in older adult samples. The loss of supportive general cognitive 
13 
processes with age may make some tests of ToM less specific for ToM deficits in older 
adults if damaged general cognitive processes are recruited during task performance. 
Additionally, the loss of general cognitive processes also may contribute to deficits in 
social functioning (Henry et aI., 2009). For example, if an individual with dementia has 
deficits in working memory, the individual may have difficulty following the flow of a 
conversation. With these issues in mind, studies examining whether ToM abilities 
decline in healthy older adults will be reviewed. 
ToM and Healthy Aging 
The first study of ToM in older adults was in 1998 (Happe et aI., 1998). Since 
that time, there have been 16 studies that have examined the performance of older adults 
on ToM tests in comparison to younger adults. These studies, their findings, and their 
limitations are outlined in Table 1. The first study, by Happe et aI. (1998), indicated that 
older adults have superior ToM abilities in comparison to younger adults, which was a 
very exciting finding when compared to the other cognitive losses that characterize the 
aging process (Schaie, 1994). However, the sample of older adults had a higher mean 
education level than the mean of the population within their age group, leading the 
authors to speculate that their superior performance on ToM may have been related to 
higher intelligence rather than age. Unfortunately, no measures of potentially 
confounding cognitive variables; such as intelligence, executive functioning, or memory; 
were collected. 
Results of the 15 studies since then have been mixed, but they have failed to 
replicate Happe et aI. 's results (1998). Subsequent studies have indicated that ToM 
abilities are either preserved or decline in older adults. Twelve of these studies have 
demonstrated a main effect of age on overall task performance on at least one ToM 
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measure, although the use of control conditions and covariates have enabled researchers 
to attribute some age effects to declines in other cognitive processes rather than a decline 
specifically related to ToM (Saltzman et aI., 2000; Maylor et aI., 2002; Phillips et aI., 
2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; German & Hehman, 2006; Wang & Su, 2006; 
Uekermann et aI., 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey 
et aI., 2008; Pardini & Nichelli, 2009). Some studies have found that lower ToM ability 
in older adults compared to younger adults can be accounted for by declines in general 
cognitive processes such as working memory or executive functioning, rather than ToM-
specific declines (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Saltzman et aI., 2000; German & Hehman, 
2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). Other studies have not been able to account for 
ToM-specific differences with general cognitive processes; they have found evidence of 
ToM-specific impairment with age on some tasks (Phillips et aI., 2002; Wang & Su, 
2006; Uekermann et aI., 2006; Slessor et aI., 2007; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey et aI., 
2008). Including 3 studies that have had mixed results across different ToM measures, 9 
studies have found evidence suggesting that ToM-specific ability is relatively preserved 
with age (Saltzman et aI., 2000; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; MacPherson et aI., 2002; 
German & Hehman, 2006; Wang & Su, 2006; Keightley et aI., 2006; McKinnon & 
Moscovitch, 2007; Slessor et aI., 2007; Verdon et aI., 2007), while 9 studies have found 
evidence suggesting that ToM may decline with age (Saltzman et aI., 2000; Maylor et aI., 
2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Phillips et aI., 2002; Wang & Su, 2006; Uekermann et 
aI., 2006; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey et aI., 2008; Pardini & Nichelli, 2009). These 
mixed findings may be explained by differences in the ToM and general cognitive tasks 
employed across studies, as well as varying levels of ToM ability within samples. Only 
one study (Bailey, 2008) has explored the relevance oflower ToM abilities in 
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community-dwelling older adults with regard to their daily lives (Bailey et aI., 2008). 
While that study found that older adults performed worse than younger adults on EYES 
and had lower levels of social participation compared to younger adults, performance on 
EYES was not a significant mediator between age and participation in social activities 
(Bailey et aI., 2008). However, cognitive empathy, as measured by a self-report 
inventory, was found to mediate the relationship between age and participation in social 
activities, providing some evidence that the ability to take the perspective of another has 
some bearing on social behavior in older adults (Bailey et aI., 2008). 
Impaired Awareness 
Impaired self-awareness has been defined as an inadequate assessment of one's 
abilities, a lack of understanding of the consequences of carrying out behaviors exceeding 
the limits of one's ability, failure to use information to change one's personal awareness 
of deficits, and problems making decisions that relate past selves to current or future 
selves (Stuss, 1991; Clare, 2004b). Notably, the terms impaired awareness, lack of 
insight, and anosognosia are used throughout the literature to refer to a lack of knowledge 
of one's cognitive and social deficits, and these terms will be used interchangeably in this 
paper. Impaired self-awareness places older adults at significant social and physical risk 
as they may not employ sufficient compensation to carry out tasks that they attempt, or 
they may choose to carry out tasks that they do not have the cognitive or physical 
resources to safely attempt even with the use of compensatory aids. Lack of awareness 
into behavioral and social deficits is such a common feature of frontotemporal dementia 
that it is part of the diagnostic criteria (Neary et at, 1998). Lack of awareness of 
cognitive deficits has also been noted in patients with AD. In one study of patients 
diagnosed with probable AD, approximately 54% of the sample was classified as 
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unaware of their cognitive deficits (Auchus et aI., 1994). Lack of awareness of deficits 
in independent living skills and memory ability have also been positively associated with 
caregiver burden, suggesting that lack of awareness may directly impact interpersonal 
relationships (Seltzer et aI., 1997; DeBettignies et aI., 1990). Additionally, individuals 
with dementia who lack awareness of their deficits have also demonstrated higher levels 
of neuropsychiatric disturbance, which has also been shown to increase caregiver burden 
(Mangone et aI., 1991; Rymer et aI., 2002). Clearly impaired awareness represents a 
clinical problem that is present in some, but not all, individuals with dementia. 
Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) typically indicates impaired memory in the 
absence of other symptoms of dementia (Petersen et aI., 2001). Patients who have been 
diagnosed with MCI appear to be at greater risk for conversion to dementia of the 
Alzheimer's type compared to older adults without MCI (Morris & Cummings, 2005). 
One study found that 31.1 % of patients diagnosed with Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(MCI) demonstrated a lack of awareness with regard to their ability to manage bank 
statements whereas only 5.6% of older adults without MCI demonstrated lack of 
awareness of their ability for that task (Okonkwo et aI., 2008). The same study found 
that patients with MCI significantly overestimated their financial abilities in other areas 
as well. Impaired self-awareness, however, is not restricted to individuals diagnosed with 
cognitive impairment. For example, in a study of patients with AD and normally aging 
individuals, 31 % of the normally aging individuals gave better assessments of their 
performance after completing cognitive tasks than their performances actually warranted 
(Graham et aI., 2005). These results suggest that impaired awareness may be present in 
community-dwelling older adults without a formal diagnosis of dementia and that 
impaired awareness increases the vulnerability of older adults in vital domains. 
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Studies have revealed contradictory findings regarding the clinical correlates of 
impaired awareness in dementia, making impaired awareness difficult to predict (see 
reviews, Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare, 2004a). Neither demographics nor 
neuropsychological measures are particularly helpful in predicting awareness deficits 
(Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare, 2004a). Furthermore, while some studies have found 
significant positive associations between dementia severity and impaired awareness 
(Mangone et aI., 1991; McDaniel et aI., 1995), other studies have not (Michon et aI., 
1994; Auchus et aI., 1994). Between AD and fvFTD and even across individuals with the 
same dementia diagnosis, there appears to be variability in the presence, severity, and 
domain (social, behavioral, cognitive, IADLs, etc.) of impaired awareness (Smith et aI., 
2000; Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare et aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a; Clare, 2004b; Evers et aI., 
2007). Additionally, there is intraindividual variability in awareness, in which an 
individual may be aware of some deficits, but not others. 
One reason for this variability may reside in the different methods used to 
measure the construct of awareness. In general, there are five ways in which awareness 
has been assessed in dementia (see reviews Clare, 2004a; Clare et aI., 2005b). Some 
studies have assessed awareness by using clinician ratings. Other studies have compared 
patients' ratings of their ability in different domains, such as memory and ADLs, with 
informants' ratings of patients' abilities in those domains. A third way that awareness 
has been assessed is by comparing patients' ratings of their performance on cognitive 
tasks with their actual performance on those tasks. Phenomenological methods have also 
been used to explore different aspects of awareness. Finally, some studies have 
employed a combination of the above methods (Clare et aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a). All of 
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these methods have been found to be limited in their ability to assess awareness (Clare et 
aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a). 
A second reason for the variability seen in awareness may be related to the 
conceptual complexities inherent in the construct of awareness. Specifically, impaired 
awareness is determined through social processes that involve a patient's self-report. 
Clare has presented a biopsychosocial model of awareness that highlights the difficulties 
in concluding that individuals are unaware of problems based on what they say or do 
(Clare, 2003; Clare, 2002). In this model, self-awareness is made possible by the 
neurological structure of the brain and the integrity of supportive cognitive processes. 
Defensive denial is a psychological process that can result in behaviors that appear to 
outside observers to indicate a lack of awareness of a problem. Defensive denial is not 
specific to dementia, however, and may be seen across all illnesses. Thus individuals 
may have difficulty accepting their problems and may deny that they have problems 
when asked about them, making them appear unaware of their deficits. In support of this, 
studies have found that patients with dementia who were more aware of their deficits also 
tended to be dysthymic or had subsyndromal depression, whereas patients categorized as 
unaware were less likely to have symptoms of depression (see review, Aalten et aI., 
2005). Thus, unawareness at the psychological level could protect the individual from 
depression. The social reasons that individuals may deny their deficits even if they are 
aware of them include the desire to present themselves well to practitioners as well as 
recognition oflimitations that could be placed on their activities (such as driving) if they 
admit that there is a problem. 
ToM appears to be closely related to self-awareness, and disruptions in ToM 
ability may explain impaired awareness in dementing disorders, particularly with regard 
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to the biological and cognitive aspects of Clare's model. Evidence for the close 
relationship between ToM and self-awareness comes from the child development and 
brain imaging literatures. First, ToM ability includes the ability to attribute mental states 
to the self as well as to others, and self-awareness involves the ability to metarepresent 
the self. Second, the abilities to attribute mental states to the self and to others appear to 
emerge in children simultaneously, suggesting that ToM is required in order to make 
mental representations about the selfthat allow for consciousness ofthe self (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1994; Happe, 2003). Based on their work with patients who have brain lesions 
and functional neuroimaging, Stuss and Anderson (Stuss & Anderson, 2004) have related 
both ToM and self-awareness to the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This overlap in 
the ventromedial areas of the prefrontal cortex may explain why individuals with fvFTD 
tend to demonstrate poor performance on ToM tasks and tend to exhibit impaired 
awareness into their behavioral and social deficits. However, although both self-
awareness and ToM may share key neural circuitry, they appear to be dissociable 
constructs. Imaging studies utilizing fMRI that have compared self-awareness and ToM 
have found that the two constructs rely on overlapping yet distinct neural substrates (Saxe 
et aI., 2006; Vogeley et aI., 2001). Experimental research using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) also found that stimulation of the right prefrontal cortex disrupted 
individuals' self-perspectives, but not their ability to infer others' mental states (Guise et 
aI., 2007). While self-awareness and ToM may be dissociable, ToM deficits may predict 
impaired self-awareness, as deficits on ToM tasks may indicate an inability to adequately 
process social information about the self that is needed to update self-schemas. 
Additionally, deficits on ToM tasks may reflect damage to neural circuitry that is also 
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needed for self-awareness. Thus, ToM tests may have clinical value in identifying and 
predicting individuals who may have or who will have deficits in self-awareness. 
To date, there have been two studies of ToM and awareness in relation to 
dementia (Cuerva et aI., 2001; Caoile, 2002). Both studies compared patients diagnosed 
with AD to healthy controls. Both studies also defined awareness as the discrepancy 
between informant and participant responses on a single measure of insight. While one 
study found no relationship between ToM and awareness (Cuerva et aI., 2001), the other 
study found a significant negative relationship (r2 = 0.42) between awareness of deficits 
and ToM performance across all participants but not within each group (Caoile, 2002). 
The study that found no relationship between ToM and awareness used a ToM task that 
has been shown to make significant demands on working memory, which was not 
controlled for in the study (Cuerva et aI., 2001). The findings of the second study suggest 
that general cognitive ability may explain the relationship between ToM and awareness in 
that study, although the authors did not specifically investigate this. Other studies have 
also found no association between awareness deficits and cognitive ability in dementia 
(see review, Aalten et aI., 2005). Importantly, in the studies that have explored ToM and 
awareness in dementia, the use of only one type of measure of awareness may not have 
adequately represented the construct of awareness and neither patient nor informant 
depression, which have been found to influence response style, were controlled for in the 
analyses. The proposed study attempted to address these limitations in order to clarify 
the relationship, if any, between impaired awareness and ToM. 
The differential effects of aging on the brains of older adults, however, suggest 
that damage to brain areas important for both ToM and awareness may be present in 
older adults with and without dementia. As noted in the paragraphs above, supposedly 
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healthy community-dwelling older adults may demonstrate impaired awareness while 
some individuals with dementia do not. This variability may be explained by individual 
differences in the integrity of underlying brain systems, but knowledge of the clinical 
correlates of unawareness is limited. Efforts to increase knowledge of the clinical 
correlates of unawareness may be helpful for identifying older adults in need of 
assistance. Individual differences in ToM ability may relate to the problem of 
unawareness of ability level found in community-dwelling older adults with and without 
dementia and may explain the variability that has been found in previous studies. There 
are other reasons for exploring the relationship between ToM and awareness in a 
community sample. First, community-dwelling older adults are likely at greater risk of 
harm when they do not have a good understanding of their abilities compared to older 
adults living in institutional settings. Second, while cognitively intact older adults may 
demonstrate impaired awareness of their ability, problems with insight into ability level 
may also indicate dementia onset. Prevalence estimates for undiagnosed dementia in 
community-dwelling older adults have been estimated to be more than 50% (Boustani et 
aI.,2003). One reason for the high prevalence rate of undetected dementia in 
community-dwelling older adults could be related to a lack of awareness of a change in 
ability. In other words, individuals would be unlikely to contact their physician when 
they are not aware of any significant changes. Iflower levels of ToM ability are related 
to problems with awareness, then ToM tests could be a useful tool for identifying older 
adults whose general safety may be at risk as well as older adults in the early stages of 
dementia. Thus, the proposed study explored the relationship between ToM and 
awareness in community-dwelling older adults, including individuals with dementia, 
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because it was hypothesized that ToM represents an important clinical correlate of 
impaired awareness. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The current study addressed the following research questions: 
1. Does ToM ability predict social resources and social behavior of older adults 
living in the community? In order to answer this question, the correlates of ToM 
were explored in relation to social networks, perceived social support, and 
interpersonal behavior. Specifically, it was hypothesized that older adults with 
lower levels of ToM ability would have smaller social networks, report lower 
levels of perceived social support, and would exhibit greater disturbance in 
interpersonal exchanges. With respect to social networks, the hypothesis was 
based on some evidence that healthy older adults demonstrate worse performance 
on advanced ToM tests compared to younger adults and the parallel phenomena 
of decreasing network sizes with increasing age. The relationship of ToM and 
problems in interpersonal relations was based on findings from research with 
ToM and clinical populations, particularly patients with fvFTD, that demonstrate 
problematic interpersonal behavior. Although social support may be relatively 
steady throughout the lifespan (according to the Convoy Model), it was 
hypothesized that deficits in ToM ability would preclude older adults from 
successfully interacting with others in a manner that would get them the support 
they need. Finally, it was hypothesized that ToM would contribute to the 
variance in these social variables even after controlling for associated 
demographics, health, and cognitive variables. A model of the primary 
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hypotheses related to the social variables and ToM is presented in Figure 1 in the 
appendix. 
2. How does ToM ability relate to awareness of cognitive and social ability? It was 
hypothesized that individuals who demonstrate lower levels of performance on 
ToM tests would also demonstrate higher levels of awareness difficulties. Further 
it was hypothesized that ToM would independently predict awareness difficulties 
even after controlling for associated variables. A model depicting the primary 




Eighty one participants were recruited for approximately one year from a variety 
of sources in the community, including advertisements and contacts with senior centers, 
churches, and physicians. To be included in the study, individuals had to be at least 60 
years of age, reside within the community, and have an informant who knew them well 
and who was willing to participate in the study'. Older adults in the severe stages of 
dementia, who demonstrated evidence of psychosis (as observed by the clinician or 
researcher), or who had significant hearing and vision deficits (as measured by Snellen 
Eye Chart) were excluded from the study. Of the 81 participants who consented to 
participate, three were excluded from data analyses for the following reasons: two 
individuals met criteria for impaired vision (WHO, 1993) and one individual dropped out 
before completing most study measures due to difficulties understanding the English 
language. 
An informant for one primary participant also refused to consent to participation. 
The primary participant was allowed to continue participating as she had consented to 
participate and also listed alternative informants that would likely participate in the place 
ofthe informant who had refused. However, the alternative informants did not choose to 
participate. Thus, this primary participant's data is included in analyses that do not 
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require informant data. In sum, the final data set for statistical analyses included 78 
primary participants and 77 informants. 
Measures 
Background Variables 
Sociodemographic information for participants and informants were collected 
through self-report, and included age, gender, ethnicity/race, education, employment 
information, household income, marital status, the relationship of the participant to the 
ipformant, the length of time that the informant has known the participant, and how often 
the informant spent time with the participant. 
Health 
Charlson Comorbidity Index (CMf) 
The self-report version of the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CMI) is a checklist of 
chronic diseases, and each disease contributing to the index is weighted according to risk 
for mortality (Charlson et aI., 1987). The CMI has significantly predicted one-year 
survival in medical patients (Charlson et aI., 1987) and recovery in the ability to carry out 
activities of daily living (ADL) in patients engaging in medical rehabilitation (Moore & 
Lichtenberg, 1996). CMI medical conditions include myocardial infarct, congestive 
heart failure, peripheral vascular disease, cerebrovascular disease, dementia, chronic 
pulmonary disease, connective tissue disease, ulcer disease, mild liver disease, diabetes, 
hemiplegia, moderate or severe renal disease, diabetes with end organ damage, any 




Items taken from the Probability of Stroke Risk Profile were used to calculate a 
composite score for vascular risk. Probability of Stroke Risk Profile items included: 
current cigarette smoking, history of cardiovascular disease, history of atrial fibrillation, 
left ventricular hypertrophy, history of high blood pressure or treatment for hypertension, 
and history of diabetes (Wolf et aI., 1991). A weighted score may be calculated using 
specific medical data, such as actual systolic blood pressure. As the current study utilizes 
a self-report format, a composite score for vascular risk was calculated by summing these 
variables, yielding a range of 0-6 for the vascular risk composite score. Summed scores 
for vascular risk factors have been used in previous studies that used a self-report format 
(Yochim, Mast, & Lichtenberg, 2003; Holley & Mast, 2007). 
Self-Rated Health 
Perceived health status was measured by asking participants: "In general, would 
you say your health is .... (circle one) Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair or Poor." 
Multiple studies in the gerontology literature have demonstrated this item's relation to 
mortality and other health outcomes (see review, Idler & Benyamini, 1997). 
Screening Measure for Parkinson's disease 
This measure is essentially a check list of symptoms that have been associated 
with Parkinson's disease (PD) in research studies. Participants either screen positive or 
negative for PD. 
Depression 
Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) 
The Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) is a self-report measure consisting of30 
statements reflecting depressive symptoms that older adults frequently report (Brink, 
1982). The response format is dichotomized; participants simply answer "yes" or "no" in 
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order to indicate their agreement with each item. The 30-item version of the GDS has 
demonstrated excellent internal consistency with a Cronbach's a of .94 and excellent 
reliability (split-half = .94; (Yesavage et aI., 1982). Sheikh & Yesavage (Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986) developed a 15-item short form that is highly correlated with the 
original30-item version (r = .84) and was used in this study to assess both participant and 
informant depressive symptoms. A cut-score of 5 has been recommended for classifying 
individuals as depressed versus non-depressed (Hermann et aI., 1996). 
Cognitive Variables 
North American Adult Reading Test (NAART) 
The North American Adult Reading Test (NAART) was used to provide an 
estimate of pre morbid IQ. For the NAART, participants read aloud 61 irregularly 
pronounced words, and their score is based on the number of words they correctly 
pronounce. The NAAR T has demonstrated excellent reliability as estimated by a 
Cronbach's a of .93 in one sample (Uttl, 2002). Correlations with the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) and the NAART were .75 for the Full Scale IQ, 
.83 for Verbal IQ, and .40 for Performance IQ (Blair & Spreen, 1989). 
Dementia Rating Scale - Version 2 (DRS-2) 
The Dementia Rating Scale - 2 (DRS-2) is a measure of global cognitive 
functioning that has demonstrated utility in detecting dementia (Jurica et aI., 2001). In 
addition to a score for overall cognitive functioning, the DRS-2 has subscales for 
attention, initiationiperseveration, conceptualization, construction, and memory abilities. 
One-week test-retest reliability for the DRS-2 total score was .97 while the subscales test-
retest reliabilities ranged from .61 to .94. The DRS-2 has acceptable levels of convergent 
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and divergent validity with other neuropsychological tests commonly used in assessing 
individuals for dementia. 
Frontal Assessment Battery (F AB) 
The Frontal Assessment Battery (F AB) is a brief, valid measure of frontal lobe 
functions (Dubois et aI., 2000). The F AB includes items that measure inhibitory control, 
motor series programming, verbal fluency, autonomy with regard to environmental cues, 
sensitivity to interference, and abstract reasoning. Participants are asked to carry out 
tasks such as naming all of the words that they can think of that begin with a specific 
letter and demonstrating a sequence of hand gestures. The F AB has good internal 
consistency (Cronbach's a = .78) and discriminant validity (correctly categorized 89.1 % 
of cases in a sample including healthy controls and patients with frontal lobe dysfunction; 
Dubois et aI., 2000). 
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test- Revised (HVLT-R) 
The Hopkins Verbal Learning Test is a widely used neuropsychological test of 
verbal learning and memory with established normative data, reliability, and validity 
(Brandt & Benedict, 2001). Participants are read a list of 12 words. After the examiner 
has read the entire list, participants are asked to say the words that they remember. The 
process is repeated over two more trials. Then is a time delay of 20-25 minutes, at the 
end of which participant long-term recall is assessed by free recall and recognition tasks. 
Letter-Number Sequencing (LN-Seq) 
Letter-number sequencing (LN-Seq) is a subtest from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Version III that measures working memory (Wechsler, 1997; 
Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2006; Lezak et aI., 2004). In the LN-Seq subtest, 
progressively longer sequences of letters interspersed with numbers are orally presented 
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to participants. After hearing the letter-number sequence, participants must mentally 
reorganize the numbers and letters in the sequence and then orally present all the numbers 
in ascending order followed by all of the letters in alphabetical order. 
Social Relations Measures 
Convoy Measure 
The size of participants' affective networks was measured using the hierarchical 
mapping technique described by Antonucci (Antonucci, 1986). Participants are given a 
diagram with three concentric circles. The word "You" is written in the center of the 
three circles. Participants are told, "this is you in the middle" (Kahn & Antonucci, 1980). 
Participants are instructed to think of "people who are important in your life right now" 
and write each person's initials into the circle that best represents how close they feel to 
that person (Antonucci, 1986). Participants are told to place "those people to whom you 
feel so close that it is hard to imagine life without them" into the innermost circle. For 
the middle circle, participants are instructed to write the initials of "people to whom you 
may not feel quite that close but who are still important to you." For the outermost circle, 
participants are instructed to write the initials of the "people whom you haven't already 
mentioned but who are close enough and important enough in your life that they should 
be placed in your personal network." Total network size is determined by adding up the 
number of people in the diagram (Antonucci, 1986; Antonucci et ai., 2002). The 
concentric circle diagram has been employed in many studies, including those making 
cross-cultural comparisons, and is considered a valid measure of affective network size. 
(Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Antonucci, 1986; Antonucci et ai., 2002; Brissette et ai., 
2000). 
Interpersonal Support Evaluation List-Short Form 
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The Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form (ISEL) was used to 
measure perceived social support. The six items on the short form of the ISEL were 
taken from the full version of the ISEL and reflect three functions of social support: 
tangible support (i.e., instrumental support), belonging (i.e., how well one identifies with 
one's social network), and appraisal support (i.e. informational support). Participants rate 
each item on a 4-point scale; possible responses include definitely false, probably false, 
probably true, and definitely true. The full version of the ISEL has been shown to 
correlate moderately with other scales of social support (Cohen et aI., 1985). The six-
item ISEL-SF has demonstrated good internal consistency (a = 0.73; (Williamson & 
Schulz, 1992). 
The Positive and Negative Social Exchange Measure 
The Positive and Negative Social Exchange Measure was used to measure the 
frequency of positive and negative social exchanges experienced by participants in the 
past month. This 24-item self-report measure contains 12 items that measure the 
frequency of positive social exchanges and 12 items that measure the frequency of 
negative social exchanges. Each item begins with the phrase, "In the past month, how 
often did the people you know ... ?" Participants respond using a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). Positive exchange domains measured by the 
positive exchange items include informational support, instrumental support, emotional 
support, and companionship. Negative exchange domains measured by the negative 
exchange items include unwanted advice or intrusion, failure to provide help, 
unsympathetic or insensitive behavior, and rejection or neglect (Newsom, 2005). 
Composite scales for negative and positive social exchanges both have very good internal 
consistency, with a = .90 for each (Newsom et aI., 2005). The negative social exchange 
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subcale (P ANSE - NSE) was used in the current study to measure frequency of negative 
social exchanges in primary participants. Higher scores indicate greater frequency of 
negative social exchanges. 
Peer Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS) 
The Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS) includes 38 items that 
represent behaviors considered socially-inappropriate, socially appropriate, or 
stereotyping and prejudicial (Henry et aI., 2009). An informant of the participant 
completes the measure with regard to the primary participant's behaviors. The 
instructions are, "Below are statements about particular topics of conversation. How 
often does ___ do the following things?" Items for the prSFS are based on previous 
research concerning socially disturbing behaviors displayed by some older adults as well 
as research with focus groups conducted specifically for the prSFS development (Henry 
et aI., 2009). Eight of the items on the scale are filler items that were added to increase 
the opportunity for informants to report positive aspects of the primary participants and to 
decrease the sense of guilt that informants may feel from reporting negative qualities 
about the primary participants. Informants use a 4-point scale (never, rarely, 
occasionally, frequently) to reflect how often the primary participants engage in a 
particular behavior. Subscales for social inappropriateness, social appropriateness, and 
stereotyping and prejudicial behavior have demonstrated excellent internal consistency, 
with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of .87, .92, and .75, respectively. The composite 
measure that represents overall social functioning also demonstrated excellent internal 
consistency (a = .94; Henry et aI., 2009), and was the variable for social functioning used 
in the current study. Higher raw scores on the composite measure indicate better social 
functioning. Significant correlations of the prSFS with a laboratory experiment in which 
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socially-inappropriate and prejudicial behaviors were provoked provide additional 
evidence of validity for the prSFS (Henry et aI., 2009). 
Awareness Measures 
Multiple methods of assessment of the construct awareness were used per Clare's 
(2004; 2005) recommendation. 
Participant-Informant Discrepancies on the Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory 
Awareness Rating Scale - Revised (MARS-MFS) 
The Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory Awareness Rating Scale -
Revised (MARS-MFS) measures subjective memory functioning. The scale was 
designed for use with patients who have Alzheimer's disease, but has been used with 
individuals who do not have diagnosis of dementia as well (Clare et aI., 2002). 
Participants are asked how they would manage in certain situations in which they would 
need to rely on their memory. Scores range from 0 (never) to 4 (always). Discrepancy 
scores are calculated between parallel participant and informant versions. The MARS-
MFS also has very good psychometric properties. Internal consistency was excellent, 
with a = .93. One-week test-retest reliability with participant self-rating was .91 and with 
informant rating of the participant was .9. The MARS-MFS also demonstrated adequate 
criterion validity, as it's correlations with other measures of awareness ranged from -.56 
to -.74. 
Participant-Informant Discrepancies on the Peer Report Social Functioning Scale -
(prSFS) 
A parallel self-report version of the prSFS was created and given to participants 
so that discrepancy scores could be calculated with respect to awareness of interpersonal 
functioning. Although this was a novel use of this scale, comparison between informant 
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report and participant report on domains of function (i.e. IADLs, memory) is common 
throughout the awareness literature (see reviews, Clare et aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a). 
Prediction of Performance Scores on the HVLT-R and Letter-Number Sequencing 
Calculation of discrepancy scores between participants' predictions of how well 
they will do on cognitive tasks versus their actual performance on those tasks is common 
in the awareness literature (O'Keeffe et aI., 2007; Green et aI., 1993; Cosentino & Stem, 
2005; Clare, 2004a; Clare et aI., 2005a). For the two tasks, participants were presented 
with standard directions and then asked, "How well do you think you will do on this 
task?" Participants were asked to rate how well they thought they would be able to do the 
task using the following 5-point response scale (0-4): very poor (0), poor (1), alright (2), 
good (3), and very good (4); this 5-point scale has been used in other measures of 
awareness (Clare, 2002). Using the normed scores on the actual performance measures, 
participants' actual performance was recoded according to the above scale. The HVLT-R 
Trial 1 score was used as the standard for short-term memory and the LN-Seq Total score 
was used as the standard for working memory. Scores 2 standard deviations (SDs) below 
the mean were classified as "very poor" and were recoded as o. Scores between 1 and 2 
SDs below the mean were classified as "poor" and were recoded as 1. Scores within 1 
SD of the mean were assigned a score of2. Scores between 1 and 2 SDs above the mean 
were assigned a score of 3. Scores above 3 SDs ofthe mean were assigned a score of 4. 
Then actual performance was subtracted from predictions of performance to obtain 
prediction awareness scores. Positive scores were hypothesized to reflect higher levels of 
unawareness. A similar method was successfully used in a recent study (Graham et aI., 
2005). 
Postdiction of Performance Scores on the HVLT-R and Letter-Number Sequencing 
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Calculation of discrepancy scores between participants' actual scores on cognitive 
tasks and their immediate assessment of their performance is hypothesized to indicate 
online monitoring ability. Following the administration of the tasks above, participants 
were asked to rate their performance on a five-point response scale (0-4): very poor (0), 
poor (1), alright (2), good (3), and very good (4), which has been used effectively in other 
postdiction measures of awareness (Clare et aI., 2002). Transformed, norm-based scores 
which represent participants' actual cognitive performances were used to calculate 
discrepancies. HVL T -R Total Recall (immediate recall over three trials) was used as the 
standard for postdiction of memory, while LN-Seq Total score was used as the standard 
for working memory. Actual performance was subtracted from postdiction assessments 
of performance to obtain postdiction awareness scores. Positive scores were 
hypothesized to reflect higher levels of unawareness and difficulties with online 
monitoring. A similar method was successfully used in a recent study (Graham et aI., 
2005). 
Theory of Mind 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (EYES) 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (EYES) is a 36-item measure that 
was created to detect subtle disturbances in social cognition. EYES has been identified 
as a social-perceptual measure of ToM (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) that involves 
the identification of complex mental states, which integrate emotions, beliefs, and 
intentions. Before the introduction of the stimuli, participants are asked to read over a 
glossary of mental state terms that are used on the test. They are then encouraged to 
consult the glossary during EYES if there are any mental state terms of which they are 
uncertain. Examples of mental state terms used on EYES include "irritated," 
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"depressed," and "accusing." During EYES, participants are shown a photograph of a 
person's eye region and four similarly, emotionally-valenced complex mental state 
words. Out of these four words, participants must select the word that best describes the 
mental state that is being expressed by the person in the photograph. In the current study, 
each item on EYES was presented on an 8 lh x 11 piece of paper. Participants were 
asked to verbally indicate or point to their answer, which was recorded by the examiner. 
The total EYES score is the total number of correct answers. Scores above 13 indicate 
better than chance performance (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001). Although groups of healthy 
adults administered less complex tests of ToM often demonstrate ceiling effects, the 
EYES scores of healthy adults have demonstrated a normal distribution (Baron-Cohen et 
aI.,2001). 
Validity for EYES has been established by the test's ability to discriminate 
clinical groups with social deficits from healthy groups or other clinical groups (Craig et 
aI., 2004; Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001; Gregory et aI., 2002). EYES has successfully 
discriminated adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger's disorder from normal 
controls and was inversely correlated with a measure of autistic traits that included items 
assessing social skills and communicative abilities (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001). EYES 
also predicted social functioning better than traditional neuropsychological tests in 
patients with schizophrenia (Bora et aI., 2006). An older version of the test that was not 
as sensitive as the revised version also found differences in performance between 
participants diagnosed with fvFTD and those diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease or 
healthy older adults (Gregory et aI., 2002) and between healthy adults and patients with 
fvFTD who scored above the cut-point for dementia on a test of global cognitive 
functioning (Torralva et aI., 2009). 
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Faux Pas Test 
The Faux Pas Test (Stone et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 2002) contains 10 stories in 
which a character commits a social faux pas and 10 control stories in which characters 
interact without a faux pas occurring. The Faux Pas Test requires participants to 
represent two mental states: the mental state ofthe person committing the faux pas and 
the mental state of the other person in the story, who may feel disturbed by the faux pas. 
Validity for the Faux Pas test has been established through its utility in detecting clinical 
groups characterized by poor social functioning. Patients with fvFTD (Gregory et aI., 
2002), bilateral lesions in the orbito-frontal cortex (Stone et aI., 1998), and Asperger's 
syndrome (Zalla et aI., 2009) tend to perform more poorly on the Faux Pas Test 
compared to healthy controls. Additionally, the Faux Pas Test has correlated with other 
measures of ToM (Gregory et aI., 2002). 
For the Faux Pas Test, the stories were read aloud by the examiner and a copy 
was also placed in front of the participant for reference in order to reduce task demands 
on working memory. After each vignette was read, participants were asked, "Did anyone 
say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?" If the participant 
indicated that a faux pas occurred in the vignette, then the examiner probed the depth of 
the participant's understanding of the faux pas with standard follow-up questions. For 
each of the 20 vignettes, examiners also asked two control questions that tested 
participant comprehension of the story. Index scores were prorated in order to control 
for comprehension difficulties. In other words, if individuals missed the control 
questions for a vignette, all questions related to that vignette were thrown out and index 
scores were calculated based only on vignettes in which individuals correctly answered 
the control questions (Gregory et aI., 2002, Stone et aI., 1998). 
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Studies have used different methods to calculate Faux Pas Test index scores, and 
the test authors recommend examining different indices (Gregory et aI., 2002; Stone et 
aI., 1998; Torralva et aI., 2007; Torralva et aI., 2009; MacPherson et aI., 2002). 
Consistent with other studies (Gregory et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007), the current 
study examined the proportion of correct hits on faux pas stories (FP HITS) and the 
proportion of correct rejections of control stories (FP REJECTIONS). A Faux Pas 
Composite score (FP Composite); which combined FP HITS, responses to two faux pas 
understanding follow-up questions, and FP REJECTIONS; was calculated, as this index 
has been used in prior studies and has been found to significantly differentiate patients 
with fVFTD from patients with Alzheimer's disease and healthy controls (Gregory et aI., 
2002; Torralva et aI., 2007). The two faux pas understanding follow-up questions were: 
1) "Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?" and 2) "Why do you 
think he/she said it?" 
Procedures 
Persons responding to advertisements were provided with a description of the 
study over the telephone and invited to participate. Those who agreed to participate and 
who met the inclusion criteria had the option of participating in the study within their 
own home or at another mutually agreed upon location, such as the researcher's lab or a 
senior center, that offered relatively private, quiet, and well-lit testing conditions. Fifty-
three participating pairs (67.9%) elected to participate within a home environment and 25 
(32.1 %) participating pairs elected to participate on the university campus. 
Before data collection began, both the participant and the informant were 
informed about the study, the likely benefits of participation, and the possible risks of 
participation. If individuals had difficulty reading, self-report measures were read to 
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them. On average, primary participants completed the study in 144 minutes (SD = 28 
minutes) and informants completed the study in 27 minutes (SD = 9 minutes). Thirty 
primary participants also participated in the informant role. 
In order to maintain confidentiality, participants were assigned an ID number. 
Informant responses were coded under the primary participants' ID numbers. Scoring of 
the measures was carried out by trained researchers. Although one research assistant was 
trained to score each participant's Faux Pas Test, another trained researcher 
independently scored stratified random selections across the sample in order to establish 
interrater reliability and manage scoring drift. Using this method, interrater reliability 
was calculated to be r = .97. Scores and demographic information were entered into a 
database and stored in a locked filing cabinet. 
Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were carried out using PASW and AMOS versions 18.0. 
Alpha was set at .05 for all analyses. Descriptive data analyses were completed first. 
As noted above, the two primary hypotheses concerned the utility of ToM measures in 
predicting social relations and awareness. The hypothesis regarding ToM and the social 
variables was examined initially using bivariate correlations and t tests. Cognitive and 
demographic variables were also included in the correlational analyses in order to 
determine whether they significantly accounted for variance in any ofthe primary 
variables of interest; they were only included in subsequent analyses if bivariate 
correlations indicated a significant relationship with primary variables. Path analysis was 
planned to test the hypothesized model depicted in Figure 1 between ToM and the social 
variables. T tests were used to compare participants performing in the impaired range on 
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ToM measures with participants performing in the non-impaired range with regard to the 
social relations variables. 
The hypotheses regarding the relationship between ToM and unawareness of 
ability were similarly explored with bivariate correlations and t tests along with select 
demographic and cognitive variables. The model depicted in Figure 2 was tested using 
path analysis. T tests were used to compare participants performing in the impaired 
range on ToM measures with participants performing in the non-impaired range with 
regard to the awareness variables. 
Three participants had one item missing on the PANSE-NSE or prSFS. Person 
mean substitution was used to impute the missing data in these cases (Hawthorne & 
Elliott, 2005). Cases in which more than one item was missing and summary or index 
scores could not be calculated were generally not included in analyses involving those 
variables. 
As parametric statistics were planned, the primary variables (ToM, awareness, 
social relations) were explored for their consistency with statistical assumptions and to 
screen for outliers. Several transformations were applied to the data due to significant 
skewness (z > 2.58), ceiling effects, or the presence of outliers (Field, 2005). These 
transformations and the meaning of the subsequent scores are detailed in Table 3, which 
also provides a reference for acronyms and abbreviations used in the study. As noted in 
the table, square root transformations were applied to the following variables: FP 
Composite score, EYES score, prSFS Social Functioning Composite score, convoy 
measure of total network size, and negative social exchanges. A natural log 
transformation was applied to the ISEL (perceived social support) score. A reciprocal 
transformation was applied to the CMI and visual acuity scores. Attempted square root, 
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logarithmic, and reciprocal transformations of the memory awareness score for the 
MARS-MFS failed due to the presence of an extreme outlier. The outlying case was then 
removed from analyses involving the MARS-MFS awareness score, which corrected the 
problems with the distribution of this variable. 
Gregory et aI. (2002) defined impairment on the EYES, FP Composite score, FP 
HITS, and Faux Pas REJECTIONS as proportion scores that fell 1.5 standard deviations 
below the mean of the healthy control group. Using the cut-scores established by 
Gregory et aI. (2002), the current sample was classified as impaired versus non-impaired 
on the Faux Pas variables. As Gregory et aI. (2002) used an older version of EYES in 
their study, their recommended cut-score was not used in the current study for EYES. 
However, their recommended methods were used, as a cut-score 1.5 standard deviations 
below the current sample's raw EYES mean was used to define impairment on EYES in 
the current study. 
Statistical Power 
1. Hypotheses related to social relations: 
As shown in Table 2, selected effect sizes from published studies concerning the 
relationship of ToM with different measures of social functioning across different 
populations suggested medium to large effect sizes. Though effect sizes that isolated 
the relationship between ToM and social functioning in older adults were not available, 
two studies have been performed using multiple regression. The first study tested ToM 
as a mediator between age and participation in pro social activities, but found that ToM 
was not a mediator in the relationship and reported no relevant statistical results (Henry et 
aI., 2009). The second study found that social cognition (ToM and emotion identification 
from faces) accounted for 38% of the variance in social intimacy in nursing home 
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residents with and without cognitive impairment (N=40) after controlling for gender, age, 
education, global cognitive functioning, and working memory (Washburn et aI., 2003). 
When emotion identification was controlled for as well, ToM accounted for an additional 
8% of the variance. This indicates a large effect size (f = 0.33). 
2. Hypotheses related to unawareness of ability 
As noted in the introduction, there have been two studies involving awareness and 
patients with AD (Cuerva et aI., 2001; Caoile, 2002). One study reported no association 
with 39 patients with AD, but used a ToM measure that appears to rely heavily on 
working memory (Cuerva et aI., 2001). Because that study did not control for working 
memory in their analysis, it is possible that ToM may have been significantly confounded 
with working memory ability. The other study, which examined individual differences in 
ToM performance across 17 participants with AD and 18 healthy controls, found that the 
relationship between ToM and insight into ability was significant with r = -.645, which is 
a large effect size (Caoile, 2002). However, this study did not control for possible 
confounding variables such as overall cognitive ability. No other studies appear to have 
investigated this link directly. Studies that support the relationship between ToM and 
unawareness into ability level, such as studies of insight in patients with fvFTD (who 
perform poorly on ToM tasks), suggest that low levels of ToM will produce profound 
deficits in awareness and indicate a large effect size. Because the first study of 
unawareness and ToM found no relationship, however, the more conservative medium 
effect size is more appropriate for these analyses. 
Sample Size 
In path analysis, sample size is usually determined based on the number of free 
parameters estimated. However, there is debate regarding the optimal number of cases 
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per estimated parameter in order to achieve adequate power to reject the null hypothesis 
while avoiding Type I error, which is more likely to occur in path analysis with very 
large sample sizes. Bollen (Bollen, 1989) has suggested that three cases per free 
parameter are necessary, whereas Bentler (Bentler, 1993) is more conservative and 
recommends at least 5 cases per free parameter. The model depicted in Figure 1 contains 
15 free parameters. Thus, for the social relations and ToM model, the smallest adequate 
sample size was between 45 (3 x 15; Bollen, 1989) and 75 (5 x 15; Bentler, 1993). The 
model of ToM and awareness depicted in Figure 2 contains 21 free parameters and 
requires a sample size that is at least between 63 (3 x 21; Bollen, 1989) and 105 (5 x 21 ; 
Bentler, 1993). Based on these guidelines, the current sample of78 was likely adequate 
to test the model of ToM and social relations, but may have lacked sufficient power to 
adequately test the model of ToM and awareness. 
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RESULTS 
Demographics and Characterization of sample 
A reference with study abbreviations and guidelines for interpreting variables that 
underwent transformation for analyses is found in Table 3. The demographic 
characteristics of the primary participants and their informants are presented in Table 4. 
The mean age of primary participants was 68.79 years old (SO = 7.75 years), with 62.8% 
of the sample below the age of70 years and 84.6% of the sample below the age of80 
years. The mean age of informants was 59.33 years, with informant ages ranging from 
21 years to 87 years. Slightly more than half(57.9%) of informants were 60 or more 
years old. As can be seen in Table 4, primary participants and informants tended to 
identify themselves as non-Hispanic White (92.3% and 88.5%, respectively) and female 
(70.5% and 75.6%, respectively). The sample was almost evenly divided between 
married/partnered and non-married participants, with 43.6% of primary participants and 
47.4% of informants reporting that they were married or partnered. Relatively high 
socioeconomic status (SES) characterized an unusually high portion of the sample, as 
56.5% of primary participants and 53.3% of informants reported having at least a 
bachelor's degree and approximately 40% of both participants and informants reported a 
household income greater than $60,000 per year. The sample was also very healthy, as 
the majority of primary participants (88.5%) and informants (88.2%) rated their health as 
good, very good, or excellent. More objective measures of health, such as the eMI and 
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vascular risk composite score also indicated low levels of illness in primary participants. 
On average, primary participants reported <1 (M = 0.75, SD = 1.2) comorbid health 
condition on the CMI, with 61.3% reporting no health conditions. Similarly, primary 
participants reported a mean of 1.03 (SD = 1.1) vascular risk conditions, with 71.8% of 
the sample reporting 0-1 vascular risk conditions. Notably, 4 participants reported having 
a history of cerebrovascular accident (stroke), with the mean time since stroke 19.8 
months (SD = 18.6 months) prior to the study. Using the screening measure for 
Parkinson's disease (PD), 48 (61.5%) of the primary participants screened negative for 
PD and 29 (37.2%) of the primary participants screened positive for PD. The group 
screening positive for PD reported significantly higher levels of comorbidity (t(72) = -
2.20, P = .03) and rated their health more poorly (t (75) = 2.9, P < .01) than the group 
screening negative for PD. Bivariate correlations indicated that cumulative vascular risk 
was significantly associated with both primary participant self-rating of health (r = -.452, 
P < .001) and comorbid health conditions (r = .354, p < .01), while self-rating of health 
and the CMI were not significantly associated with one another in this sample. 
Both primary participants and informants tended to report a low level of 
depressive symptoms. The mean GDS score (possible range of 0-15) for primary 
participants was 1.51 (95% CI [1.17, 1.92]), with only 4 primary participants (5.2%) 
endorsing a significant level of depressive symptoms, as determined by endorsement of 
more than 5 items (Hermann et aI., 1996). The mean GDS score for informants was 1.lO 
(95% CI [0.79, 1.44]), with only 3 informants (3.9%) endorsing a significant level of 
depressive symptoms. 
As can be seen in Table 5, the sample of primary participants in the current study 
was characterized by slightly higher than average cognitive functioning. With the 
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exception of the measure of verbal IQ (NAART), all scores on cognitive measures were 
adjusted for age. There were two participants (2.6%) who obtained raw scores for global 
cognitive functioning (DRS-2) that were at or below the cut-off score of 123 for dementia 
(Jurica et aI., 2001). When these two scores were adjusted for age and education, they 
indicated the presence of cognitive impairment. 
The relationship between the participants and their informants is detailed in Table 
6. Most informants were likely peers of primary participants, as 42.9% categorized 
themselves as friends or siblings and 26% categorized themselves as spouses. 
Approximately 20% of the informants were the child or children-in-Iaw of primary 
participants. On average, informants knew primary participants for 30.19 years (SD = 
19.22). For the majority of the sample, the frequency of contact was high, with 88.4% of 
informants reporting interaction at least multiple times per week with primary 
participants. 
Characterization of Performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) Variables 
Means and confidence intervals for the two primary ToM measures, the Faux Pas 
Test and EYES, are displayed in Tables 7 and 8, along with comparison data from recent 
studies utilizing these measures with non-clinical, older adult samples. While the mean 
value for EYES in the current study appears slightly above the mean EYES scores in the 
comparison studies, the current sample is also younger. As can be seen in Table 8, the FP 
Composite proportion score for the current study appears much lower than the FP 
composite proportion score from the study by Gregory et aI. (2002), which was based on 
only 10 participants - who were younger on average than the participants in the current 
study. The bivariate correlation between the EYES test and the FP Composite score was 
not significant (r = .1 0, p > .05). 
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The scores for FP HITS and FP REJECTIONS appear similar between the current 
study and the two comparison studies. As a reminder, the FP HITS score refers to correct 
identification of stories with a faux pas as containing faux pas, while the FP 
REJECTIONS score refers to correct identification of a story without a faux pas as not 
containing a faux pas. In the current study, 61 participants correctly identified 100% of 
the stories on the Faux Pas test as containing a faux pas (FP HITS), while 17 participants 
scored less than 100% correct for FP HITS. With regard to FP REJECTIONS, 46 
participants correctly rejected 100% of stories on the Faux Pas Test that did not contain a 
Faux Pas, while 32 participants scored less than 100% correct. As scores for FP HITS 
and FP REJECTIONS demonstrated significant ceiling effects, their inclusion in 
subsequent analyses was limited. 
As noted in the Methods section, impairment on the ToM measures was also 
examined based on previously published criteria (Gregory et aI., 2002). Note that while 
the cut-scores for the Faux Pas test indices were taken from a study comparing patients 
with dementia and healthy controls, the cut-score for the EYES test used in the current 
study was based on the raw mean and standard deviation (1.5 SD below the mean) of the 
current sample, as cut scores were not available in the literature for the revised version of 
the EYES test. Thus, the term impairment is used for simplicity with regard to both Faux 
Pas test and EYES performance in the current study, but may actually indicate relatively 
low performance within the current sample with regard to EYES performance. 
Eight participants scored in the impaired range on the EYES test, two participants 
scored in the impaired range for FP HITS, and ten participants scored in the impaired 
range for FP REJECTIONS. Twenty-four participants scored in the impaired range on 
the FP Composite score, and impairment on this index was examined further, given the 
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relatively low rates of impairment on FP HITS and FP REJECTIONS, which collectively 
make up 50% of the FP Composite score. For the first follow-up question (Why 
shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?), 52.6% of the sample obtained 
100% correct and 74.4% obtained 90% or more correct. For the second follow-up 
question (Why do you think he/she said it?), 2.6% of the sample achieved 100% correct 
and 67.9% of the sample achieved 50% or less correct. Across participants, 48.4% of 
responses to the explanation question were correct. Thus, performance on the second 
follow-up question, which concerns attribution and explanation of behavior, appears to at 
least partially explain the lower FP Composite scores in the current study compared to 
extant studies as well as the greater numbers of participants in the current study who were 
categorized as impaired on the FP Composite score compared to the other ToM measures 
of impairment. 
Impairment on one ToM index did not necessarily predict impairment on other 
ToM indices (EYES and FP Composite: (X2 (1) = 1.55, P = 0.21; EYES and FP 
REJECTIONS (l (1) = 1.18, p = 0.28). Only 4 participants (5.1 %) performed in the 
impaired range on a Faux Pas Test index and EYES. One participant (1.3%) performed 
in the impaired range across all four ToM impairment indices, one participant (1.3%) 
performed in the impaired range across three ToM impairment indices (EYES, FP 
Composite, and FP REJECTIONS), and eight participants (10.2%) performed in the 
impaired range on two ToM impairment indices. As only two participants !llet criteria 
for impairment on FP HITS, chi-square analysis was not appropriate. However, there 
was no apparent pattern of impairment for the two participants scoring in the impaired 
range on FP HITS, as one of the participants scored in the impaired range across all ToM 
measures, while the other scored in the impaired range on the closely-related FP 
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Composite score only. One of the participants scored in the impaired range (T score = 
21) on the HVLT-R Delayed Recall. Both participants were in their early 60's, had at 
least a college education, and performed in at least the average range on other cognitive 
measures. 
Characterization of Performance on Social Relations Variables 
The social relations variables are detailed in Tables 9 and 10. As shown in Table 
9, primary participants' social networks contained a mean of24.60 individuals (based on 
transformed data). On average, primary participants reported low levels of negative 
social exchanges and high levels of social support, and informants tended to rate primary 
participants as exhibiting relatively high levels of social functioning. As shown in Table 
10, higher levels of perceived social support were associated with larger social networks 
and reduced frequency of negative social exchanges. The informant-rated measure of 
social functioning (prSFS) was not significantly associated with the other social relations 
measures, which were completed by the primary participants themselves. 
Characterization of Performance on Awareness Variables 
As displayed in Table 11, mean discrepancy scores were minimal across the 
awareness measures, with primary participants tending to slightly underestimate their 
performance or functioning on average. Given the larger range of possible discrepancy 
scores on the MARS-MFS and prSFS, the likelihood of obtaining a discrepancy score of 
o was much lower than on the performance-based measures. Thus, a larger portion of the 
sample is categorized as underestimating or overestimating performance on the 
informant-based measures. The transformed discrepancy scores were used in subsequent 
analyses. 
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Bivariate correlations were used to test the relationships between the awareness 
variables, and the results are depicted in Table 12. The two informant-based measures of 
awareness (prSFS and MARS-MFS) were significantly positively associated (r = .28, p < 
.05), indicating that individuals who overestimated social functioning were also likely to 
overestimate memory functioning. Primary participant and informant ratings of social 
functioning were not significantly associated (r = - .18, P = .12). Informant ratings of 
primary participant memory on the MARS-MFS were not significantly related to primary 
participant ratings on the MARS-MFS (r = .16, P = .17) or actual memory performance 
on the HVLT -R (r = 0, p > .05), whereas primary participant ratings of memory 
performance on the MARS-MFS were significantly related to actual memory 
performance on the HVLT -R (r = -.31, P < .01). Although primary participant and 
informant ratings were not correlated on either the MARS-MFS or prSFS, primary 
participant ratings and informant ratings across the measures were similarly correlated (r 
= .25, P < .05; r = -.25, P < .05, respectively (correlation for informant ratings is negative 
due to transformed variable)), which may indicate response style. The performance-
based measures of awareness were significantly correlated within the cognitive domains 
(predictions and postdictions were correlated on the two cognitive measures), but 
otherwise, the performance-based measures were not correlated with one another or with 
either of the informant-based measures of awareness. As shown in Tables 12 and 13, the 
performance-based measures of awareness were also significantly associated with the 
associated cognitive variable used to gauge actual performance as well as between the 
prediction awareness and postdiction awareness scores based on each measure. 
Regarding the actual ratings of performance, the HVLT-R prediction ratings were not 
significantly associated with performance (r = .08, P > .05), but the HVLT -R postdiction 
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ratings were associated with performance (r = .52, P < .001). Both the LN-Seq 
prediction and postdiction ratings were significantly associated with performance (r = 
.44, P < .001, r = .30, P < .01, respectively). 
Associations between Primary Variables, Demographics, Health, and Depression 
The impact of key demographic variables, such as gender and ethnicity, on the 
primary variables (ToM, awareness, and social relations) was tested with t tests. The 
performance-based memory awareness scores significantly differed according to gender 
(Table 14). On average, men tended to overestimate memory performance, while 
females tended to underestimate memory performance (Table 14). Gender did not 
differentiate scores on the other primary variables and was not associated with impaired 
versus non-impaired performance on the ToM measures. 
Although the majority of the sample identified themselves as non-Hispanic White 
with regard to ethnicity, ethnicity was cautiously considered by comparing performance 
on primary study variables, as well as demographic and cognitive variables, between 
African-American primary participants (n = 5) and non-Hispanic White (n = 72) primary 
participants using t tests. Significant results are displayed in Table 15. As shown in the 
table, FP Composite scores were significantly lower for the African-American group 
compared to the non-Hispanic White group. Significantly, 4 out of5 of the African-
American participants scored in the impaired range with the FP Composite score (l (1, 
N=77) = 5.94, p = .02). The impairment scores for FP REJECTIONS and EYES did not 
demonstrate a significant association with ethnicity ("l (1, N = 77) = 3.45, p> .05; "I: (1, 
N = 77) = 0.53, P > .05, respectively). The African-American group also overpredicted 
memory performance on the HVLT -R Prediction awareness measure compared to the 
non-Hispanic White group, which underpredicted performance on average. Ttests 
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comparing the non-Hispanic White group and African-American group on demographic 
and cognitive measures revealed significant differences in self-ratings of health between 
the two groups, with African-American participants rating their health significantly worse 
than non-Hispanic White participants. Differences in level of education and verbal IQ 
between the African-American group and the non-Hispanic White group also approached 
significance, with the African-American group reporting lower levels of education and 
obtaining slightly lower verbal IQ scores compared to non-Hispanic Whites. 
The relationships between age, education level, depression level, health variables, 
and ToM, awareness, and social relations were tested using bivariate correlations and are 
depicted in Tables 10, 12, and 16. Greater memory awareness as measured by HVLT-R 
postdiction awareness score was significantly associated with higher levels of education, 
but education was not significantly associated with any of the other primary variables. 
Older age was also significantly associated with poorer performance on the EYES test (r 
= .33, p < .01), but was not associated with the FP Composite score, any of the social 
relations variables, or any of the awareness variables. 
Regarding health, greater medical comorbidity was associated with poorer 
performance on the Faux Pas Test (r = .24, P < .05). Lower levels of vascular risk were 
associated with larger social networks (r = -.42, P < .01), higher levels of perceived social 
support (r = .25, p < .01), and better social functioning (r = .24, P < .05). Primary 
participant self-rating of health was also associated with higher levels of perceived social 
support (r = -.27, P < .05). PD screening status did not differentiate scores on any of 
the primary variables. 
Despite relatively low endorsement of depressive symptoms across the sample, 
depressive symptoms in primary participants were significantly correlated with all social 
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relations measures. Specifically, higher levels of depressive symptoms in primary 
participants were associated with smaller social network size (r = -.30, p < .01), higher 
frequency of negative social exchanges (r = .27, P < .05), lower levels of perceived social 
support (r = .38, P < .01), and lower levels of social functioning (r = .24, P < .05). 
Neither ToM nor any ofthe awareness measures were significantly associated with 
depressive symptoms in primary participants with correlational analyses. However, the 
difference between the impaired and non-impaired participants on the EYES test 
approached significance with regard to depressive symptoms (t(76) = -1.89, P = 0.06), 
with the impaired group reporting fewer depressive symptoms (M = 0.66, 95% CI 
[0,1.79]) compared to the non-impaired group (M =1.64, 95% CI[1.26, 2.08]). 
Associations between Primary Variables and Cognition 
Tables 17-19 display bivariate correlations between the primary variables, visual 
acuity, and cognitive variables. As shown in Table 17, all of the cognitive measures were 
significantly associated with one another. Regarding the ToM measures, the EYES test 
was significantly associated with visual acuity (r = .27, P < .05) and all measures of 
cognition, with the exception of the F AB. Essentially, better performance across 
cognitive measures was predictive of better performance on EYES. The Faux Pas Test 
was not significantly associated with any of the cognitive measures or with visual acuity. 
T tests comparing cognitive functioning between the impaired and non-impaired groups 
on the ToM measures found similar results with regard to EYES, but also indicated that 
the impaired groups on both EYES and FP REJECTIONS obtained lower scores on the 
FAB (see Table 20). Additionally, the impaired group on the FP Composite score had a 
significantly lower verbal IQ than the non-impaired group (see Table 20). 
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Regarding the social relations variables (see Table 18), larger social network size 
was significantly associated with better global cognitive functioning (r = .28, p < .05), 
better memory (r = -.33, p < .01), and better working memory (r = .28, p < .05). Greater 
perceived social support was significantly associated with better global cognition (r = -
.24, p < .05), and better social functioning was significantly associated with better 
memory (r = -.27, p < .05). 
For the awareness variables (results displayed in Table 19), neither informant-
based memory awareness nor social functioning awareness were significantly associated 
with any of the cognitive variables included in the study. Overprediction as measured by 
the HVLT -R prediction awareness score was associated with poorer global cognitive 
functioning (r = -.23, p < .05), poorer memory r = .55, p < .01), and poorer frontal lobe 
functioning (r = .31, p < .01). None of the other performance-based measures of 
awareness were significantly associated with other cognitive variables. 
Hypothesis J: 
Hypothesis 1 stated that ToM ability would predict social relations, and the 
hypothesis was tested with bivariate correlations, t tests, and path analysis. As can be 
seen in Table 21, bivariate correlations did not support a significant relationship between 
ToM and any of the social relations variables. Ttests comparing impaired versus non-
impaired performance on ToM measures also did not indicate that ToM is related to 
social relations. Because ethnicity was associated with FP Composite performance and 
there were few minority participants who participated in the study, the correlational 
analyses were repeated excluding all ethnicities except for non-Hispanic White 
participants. The analyses including only the non-Hispanic White participants remained 
non-significant. 
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The model depicting the relationship between ToM and social relations that is 
shown in Figure 1 was tested using path analysis with all participant data. As suggested 
by the correlational analyses and depicted in Figure 3, ToM ability did not predict social 
relations as there were no direct effects for either of the ToM variables on any of the 
social relations variables. The model was a poor fit for the data (X2 (6) = 26.33, p < .001; 
l/df= 4.39; CFI = 0; Nfl = .17, IF! = .21, TLI = -2.06, RMSEA = 0.21). More than 
90% of the variance in each of the social relations variables was unexplained by the 
model. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2 stated that ToM ability would predict problems with awareness of 
cognitive and social abilities. The hypothesis was tested with bivariate correlations, t 
tests, and path analysis. As can be seen in Table 22, the sole significant correlation 
between ToM and awareness was found between the FP Composite score and the MARS-
MFS awareness score (r = -.25, p < .05). However, this relationship was not in the 
predicted direction, as better FP Composite scores were associated with overestimation of 
memory function (i.e. less awareness). 
Because ethnicity differentiated Faux Pas performance and the HVLT-R-based 
awareness measures and because minority participation was low in the study, the 
correlational analyses were repeated excluding all ethnicities except for non-Hispanic 
White participants (n = 72). The results were similar, except that the FP Composite score 
was no longer significantly associated with memory awareness as measured by the 
MARS-MFS (r = -.21, P = .09, n = 71), and the FP Composite Score was significantly 
associated with working memory awareness (LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness; r = -.25, P 
= .03, n = 70). Similar to memory awareness, this correlation was in the opposite 
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direction, with better FP Composite scores associated with overestimation of working 
memory performance on the Letter-Number Sequencing subtest. 
T tests were also used to test whether impairment on ToM measures significantly 
impacted scores for awareness. The results, which are displayed in Table 23, found 
significant differences in memory awareness, as measured by the MARS-MFS, between 
the impaired and non-impaired groups on the FP Composite score and FP REJECTIONS. 
An examination of the means for both measures of impairment indicates that while the 
impaired groups did not overestimate their memory function as hypothesized, their 
estimations were far less accurate than the non-impaired groups. In other words, the 
impaired group significantly underestimated their memory functioning compared to the 
non-impaired group, which demonstrated more accuracy in the estimations. Differences 
between the impaired and non-impaired groups on EYES also approached significance 
with regard to prediction of social awareness (prSFS), and the means for the discrepancy 
scores for each group also suggest a tendency toward underprediction in the impaired 
group. While the performance-based measures of awareness did not demonstrate 
significant differences according to the presence of impairment, two relationships 
approached significance. Differences between the impaired and non-impaired groups on 
FP REJECTIONS approached significance with regard to memory awareness on the 
HVL T -R Postdiction Awareness measure. Examination of the means indicated that the 
differences were in the hypothesized direction, with the impaired group overestimating 
their performance and the non-impaired group providing more accurate estimates of 
performance, on average. Differences between the impaired and non-impaired groups 
on EYES also approached significance for the LN-Seq Prediction Awareness measure. 
However, the means for the impaired and non-impaired groups, while approaching a 
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significant difference, indicated that both groups underestimated performance on average, 
with the non-impaired group less accurate than the impaired group on average. 
The model depicting the relationship between ToM and awareness that is shown 
in Figure 2 was tested using path analysis with all ethnicities included. As suggested by 
the correlational analyses and depicted in Figure 4, ToM ability only predicted MARS-
MFS awareness scores. The model was a poor fit for the data (X2 (15) = 73.14, P < .001; 
l/df= 4.88; OFI = .81, CFI = .07; NFl = .19, IFI = .23, TLI = -.74, RMSEA = 0.23). 
While the model explained 7.9% of the variance in MARS-MFS scores, the model failed 
to account for at least 95% of the variance in the each ofthe other awareness variables. 
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DISCUSSION 
The current study aimed to establish empirical links between ToM and two 
conceptually-related constructs, social relations and awareness, in a sample of community 
dwelling older adults. Despite the use of empirically validated measures for the three 
primary constructs, the hypotheses were generally not supported by the data. Neither 
ToM measure predicted the social relations variables using correlational analysis, and 
impairment on ToM tests did not significantly impact social relations scores. The results 
suggested potential links between awareness and ToM, but the findings were mixed, with 
one hypothesized association that only approached significance and other significant 
associations in the opposite direction of the original hypothesis. Possible explanations 
for the results are discussed in the sections below, along with the implications of the 
study findings. First, issues related to ToM that span both hypotheses are discussed, 
followed by the implications of the findings related to each main hypothesis. For 
reference purposes, Table 24 provides an overview of basic associations between all the 
ToM indices and most study variables. 
What is the meaning and clinical relevance of impairment on ToM tests in community-
dwelling older adults? 
Both of the measures of ToM that were used in the current study are theorized to 
measure advanced ToM abilities, and scores on these measures may reflect subtle 
differences in ToM across healthy older adults. Prior studies with patients with fvFTD 
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and healthy controls have found significant differences between the groups on all ToM 
indices (EYES, FP REJECTIONS, FP HITS, and FP Composite) used in the current 
study (Gregory et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007). EYES and the Faux Pas Test were not 
significantly associated with one another in the current study. The lack of association 
between the two ToM measures is consistent with the findings of Gregory et aI. (2002), 
but inconsistent with the findings of Torralva et aI. (2007). Notably, both studies 
compared ToM performance in healthy controls and patients with fvFTD, and the 
Gregory et aI. study included patients with AD as well. In the Gregory et aI. study, the 
Faux Pas Test correlated with other ToM tests, but the EYES test did not. Although 
both tests are considered measures of ToM, the EYES test has been related to socio-
perceptual ability, while the Faux Pas test supposedly measures integration of cognitive 
and emotional information within a social context (Tager-Flusberg et aI., 2000; Stone et 
aI., 1998; Shamay-Tsoory et aI., 2007). In sum, because EYES and the Faux Pas Test are 
thought to measure slightly different aspects of advanced ToM, they may not always 
correlate. 
Comparisons of mean FP Composite scores and EYES scores with previous 
samples of community-dwelling older adults suggest that the current sample performed 
similarly with regard to EYES, FP HITS, and FP REJECTIONS. However, the mean FP 
Composite score for the current study was one standard deviation lower than the mean of 
one of the comparison studies (Gregory et aI., 2002). Notably, the comparison study by 
Gregory et aI. (2002) used a much smaller sample (n=10) that was also ten years younger 
on average than the current sample (Table 8). On the other hand, the current sample had 
higher levels of education than the healthy controls in the Gregory et aI. study (mean = 
12.1 years, SD = 1.5 years), but greater ToM impairment was found in the current sample 
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than in the healthy controls in the Gregory et aI. study. While age may explain the lower 
scores on the FP Composite measure, the current study's findings may also indicate the 
presence of subtle ToM deficits in community-dwelling older adults. 
This is the first study to examine the presence of ToM impairment (defined as 
performance 1.5 standard deviations below the mean) in community-dwelling older 
adults. Notably, the two clinical studies of older adults that utilized both EYES and the 
Faux Pas Test compared patients with fvFTD to "healthy controls" who were matched for 
age and education. Only one of these studies compared impaired vs. non-impaired 
performance on the ToM measures (Gregory et aI., 2002), and that study found no 
impairment in the control group on either ToM test, which may be related to the stringent 
screening of control participants for clinical studies in order to categorize them as 
"healthy." In community-dwelling samples, researchers have shown that older adults 
tend to perform worse on EYES compared to younger adults, but the findings comparing 
older adults and younger adults on the Faux Pas Test have been mixed (see Table 1). 
The current study adds to the literature with the finding of impairment on ToM 
tests in community-dwelling older adults without a formal diagnosis of dementia and 
with relatively normal cognitive performance. Some level of impairment on ToM was 
expected across the sample based on the likelihood that some participants would have 
experienced changes in brain regions (e.g. medial and ventromedial areas of prefrontal 
cortex) that are thought to underlie ToM ability (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006; Gregory et aI, 
2002; Gallagher et aI., 2000; Rowe et aI., 2001; Baird et aI., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006; 
Stuss et aI., 2001). Consistent with these expectations, impairment on ToM measures 
was found across participants, with 10% - 30% of the sample demonstrating impairment 
on each of the following ToM indices: EYES, FP REJECTIONS, and the FP Composite 
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score, which includes questions related to faux pas understanding. Impairment was 
defined by Gregory et aI. (2002) as performance 1.5 standard deviations below the mean 
of their healthy controls. It is possible that the rates of impairment on ToM in the current 
study would have been significantly lower if the more typical cut-off for impairment - 2 
standard deviations below the mean of the normative sample - was used. Though age 
effects were not found within the current sample, it is important to note that the standard 
of impairment used for the FP Composite score was derived from healthy controls 
participating in a clinical study and they were approximately 10 years younger on 
average than the primary participants in the current study. These findings suggest that 
research to establish age-based normative data may be useful in delineating impairment 
on ToM tests in older adults. 
Participants meeting criteria for impairment varied across the ToM indices, with 
only 12.8% of the sample demonstrating impairment on more than one ToM index. 
Varying patterns of impairment may be related to true differences in the aspect of ToM 
being measured by each index or may be explained by differences in general cognitive 
processes needed to carry out each ToM task. FP HITS demonstrated the least 
impairment, with only 2 participants scoring in the impaired range. Importantly, a study 
comparing adult patients with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) to healthy controls on the Faux 
Pas Test found no differences in FP HITS between the groups, but significant differences 
in FP REJECTIONS, with the AS group more likely to incorrectly identify a faux pas as 
occurring in a story without a faux pas (Zalla et aI., 2009). FP REJECTIONS may 
strongly indicate ToM-specific impairment, as patients with AS have been noted to have 
ToM-specific impairment in the absence of other general cognitive impairment (Baron-
Cohen, 2001). At the same time, however, the impaired group on FP REJECTIONS in 
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the current study also had significantly lower F AB performance, indicating that frontal 
lobe dysfunction may at least partially account for the poorer scores on FP 
REJECTIONS. Certainly, more research is needed to clarify whether differences in 
general cognitive processes contribute to performance on each index. 
The FP Composite scores demonstrated very high levels of impairment, with 30% 
of the sample falling in the impaired range. The means for the FP Composite score also 
appeared much lower for the current sample compared to those ofthe healthy controls in 
Gregory et aI. (2002). The high rates of impairment were most likely related to high rates 
of incorrect responses to the explanation/attribution question (e.g., "Why did he/she say 
it?"). Relatively high rates of correct responses were found for FP HITS, FP 
REJECTIONS, and identification of the faux pas, but only 48.4% of responses across the 
sample were correct for the explanation/attribution question. 
Although an analysis of the explanation/attribution question was not carried out in 
the current study, the literature suggests that non-clinical samples may exhibit some 
difficulty with this question. For example, one study that found differences on the Faux 
Pas Test between older adults and younger adults noted that the older adults 
demonstrated particularly poor performance on the questions related to faux pas 
understanding (Wang et aI., 2006). Zalla et aI. (2009) carried out a detailed study of the 
responses to the explanation/attribution question with adult patients with AS and healthy 
controls. While only 39.3% of the explanation/attribution questions were answered 
correctly by the AS group, the control group (mean age = 27.8 years, SD = 4.5 years) 
answered 78.7% of the explanation/attribution questions correctly. The authors' analysis 
of the errors on this question found that both the AS group and the control group 
erroneously attributed the faux pas to a character's psychological traits (15.9% and 10%, 
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respectively), but significant differences between error categories were found between 
the AS group and the control group in attribution of faux pas to internal psychological 
states (emotions, sensations, etc.; 15.9% and 6.7%, respectively) and to malicious 
intentions (9.8% and 0.7%, respectively). 
Because the attribution/explanation question appeared to severely impact the rates 
of impairment on the FP Composite score in the non-clinical sample used in the current 
study, more research is needed to better understand the utility of this question, the types 
of errors committed by community-dwelling older adults, and whether these errors are 
related to ToM-specific deficits or can be attributed to variability in other cognitive 
processes. With regard to the latter, one study found that older adults were more likely 
than middle-aged adults to make the fundamental attribution error (i.e. correspondence 
bias), which is when internal, stable causes are used to explain another individual's 
behavior and logical, situational factors are largely ignored (Follett & Hess, 2002). In 
that study, middle-aged adults also made the fundamental attribution error (though at 
lower rates than older adults), indicating that it is a relatively normal error throughout 
adulthood. Complexity in cognitive operations was found to account for some of the 
variance in the fundamental attribution error in both the middle-aged adult and older 
adult groups, suggesting a role for general cognitive processes that could also account for 
some ofthe variability on the explanation/attribution question in the current study. In a 
conceptual paper, Andrews (2001) discussed the fundamental attribution error and ToM 
research, suggesting that attribution processes rely on ToM abilities. What is unclear 
from the current study is whether the poor performance of the current sample on the 
explanation/ attribution question represents normal or abnormal functioning, whether it 
can be attributed to general cognitive processes, and whether it indicates subtle, but 
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meaningful differences in ToM. With these issues in mind, the results of the study in 
relation to the two main hypotheses will be discussed. 
ToM Does Not Predict Social Relations in Community-Dwelling Older Adults 
ToM was not significantly associated with social relations in the current study. 
As a group, the sample appeared to be socially active with good interpersonal 
relationships, reporting high levels of function across the social relations measures, as 
shown in Table 9. The sample reported having larger social networks than past samples 
using the Convoy measure (Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Antonucci et aI., 2002). For 
example, a study published in 2002 (Antonucci et aI.) found that the average network size 
for u.s. males was 6.82 individuals (SD = 2.95) and for u.s. females was 7.07 
individuals (SD = 2.92), while the current sample had an average network size above 20 
(see Table 9). Informants' reports of participants' social functioning on the prSFS also 
indicated good social functioning, but were more consistent with another sample of 
community-dwelling older adults with which the measure was used in the past (Henry et 
aI.,2009). The relatively high overall social functioning and low variability in social 
relations observed in the current sample may have limited the results linking ToM with 
social functioning. 
The social relations construct was well-represented in the current study, as the 
measures used were based on both informant report and self-report. Though the 
measures represented different facets of social relations, the three self-report measures 
demonstrated associations with one another, but not with the informant-based measure. 
Although it is important to consider that individuals with deficits on ToM may not 
accurately report their social functioning (Eslinger et aI., 2005), ToM was also not 
associated with informant report, and the current study found that primary participants 
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had relatively good awareness. However, the lack of association between the informant-
based social functioning measure and the self-report social measures along with the 
finding that the informants' reports of participants' memory functioning did not relate to 
participants' actual memory scores on cognitive testing, suggests questionable accuracy 
with regard to informants' ratings of participants' memory and possibly social 
functioning. Thus, some ofthe social relations measures used in the current study may 
be more valid than others. 
ToM is considered a social-cognitive construct; such constructs refer to cognitive 
processes that allow human beings to understand their social world and interact 
effectively with others (Washburn et aI., 2003). Empirical support for the link between 
ToM and social relations comes from the finding that ToM impairment is highly 
prevalent in clinical samples with prominent social deficits but relatively intact 
performance on traditional cognitive tests (Gregory et aI., 2002; Baron-Cohen et aI., 
1999). While evidence directly linking measures of social relations to ToM is limited, a 
few studies have found a significant relationship between the two constructs in clinical 
samples (Frith et aI., 1994; Brune et aI., 2007, Bora et aI., 2006), in samples of normally 
developing children (Eggum et aI., 2011, Watson et aI., 1999, & Astington & Jenkins, 
1995), and in a sample of older nursing home residents (Washburn et aI., 2003). Thus, 
research increasingly suggests a valid role for ToM in predicting social relationships and 
behavior in some groups. 
The current study did not find a significant association between ToM and multiple 
measures of social relations in community-dwelling older adults, which is consistent with 
Bailey et aI., 2008, who also did not find a direct connection between ToM (EYES) and 
social functioning in community-dwelling older adults. Even the use of cut-scores to 
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indicate ToM impairment did not significantly differentiate older adults with regard to 
social network size, perceived social support, negative social exchanges, and social 
functioning. Furthermore, although the sample size was not large, the correlations 
between ToM and social relations variables were so small that the likelihood of Type II 
error appears low. Thus, the current study is consistent with extant research suggesting 
that existing ToM measures, which presumably should demonstrate an association with 
social relations given their purported measurement of a social-cognitive construct, may 
have limited validity and usefulness for predicting social functioning in community-
dwelling older adults. 
Cross-sectional associations between ToM and social relations may be more 
discernible in clinical samples which demonstrate ToM-specific deficits. The common 
factor across clinical studies that link ToM and social relations is evidence of different 
underlying brain function compared to the average adult. For example, an fMRI study of 
ToM found that high functioning patients with AS recruited different brain areas 
compared to healthy controls when completing ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999). 
Presumably, the brain areas impacted during child development and in clinical samples 
include areas that are required for ToM-specific ability, such as the amygala and the 
medial and orbital areas of the prefrontal cortex (Stuss et aI., 2001; Baron-Cohen et aI., 
1999). While the average older adult may perform more poorly on some ToM tests 
compared to younger adults, the poor or impaired performance of some older adults may 
be attributable to declines in general cognitive processes rather than a ToM-specific 
deficit associated with damage to underlying brain areas necessary for ToM. Thus, 
community-dwelling older adults may lack the ToM-specific deficits that appear to 
impact social relationships in clinical samples. As a result, community-dwelling older 
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adults' poor perfonnances on ToM tests may not predict problems in social functioning. 
Future research should continue to focus on establishing links between ToM and social 
relations in clinical samples of older adults that appear to have ToM-specific impainnent. 
It is also possible that ToM ability may actually decline in nonnally aging 
individuals, but in a less-pronounced manner than in clinical samples. At the same time, 
social ability could be bolstered to some extent by intact general cognitive processes. For 
example, AS patients have succeeded in identifying faux pas by applying well-learned 
social rules, even though they ultimately exhibit more difficulty with attribution and 
empathy compared to age-matched controls (Zalla et aI., 2009). In the current study, 
ToM impainnent may be marking subtle declines in brain processes and associated social 
functioning that are too subtle to be detected by these measures of social relations. Thus, 
alternative methods of measuring the nuances of social behavior, such as observational 
techniques, may be more likely to expose any subtle differences in social interactions 
detected by the ToM measures. Moreover, longitudinal studies of how ToM changes 
over time and whether it predicts future impainnent in social relations could help clarify 
the validity of ToM tests for predicting social functioning in community-dwelling 
samples of older adults. 
A final conclusion that may be drawn from the social relations analyses in the 
current study is that variability in social relations in most community-dwelling older 
adults may be better explained by factors other than ToM ability. For example, in the 
current study, social relations variables were associated with measures of health, 
depression, global cognitive functioning, memory, and working memory, and these 
findings are consistent with findings from other studies (Barnes et aI., 2004a; Antonucci 
et aI., 1997; Russell et aI., 1991; Seeman & Chen, 2002). Any future studies of ToM 
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and social relations in either clinical samples or community-dwelling older adults will 
need to consider the role that these factors may play. 
Associations Between ToM and Awareness Were Mixed 
Awareness of ability level is important throughout the lifespan in order for an 
individual to judge whether participation in activities is likely to be successful and safe. 
Although clinical samples of older adults with dementing disorders may demonstrate 
significant lack of awareness of their deficits, non-clinical samples have also been noted 
to demonstrate problems with awareness (Neary et aI., 1998; Auchus et aI., 1994; 
Graham et aI, 2005). Despite numerous studies, the clinical correlates of unawareness are 
not well-defined (see reviews, Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare, 2004a). ToM and awareness 
emerge at the same time during childhood and have been linked in patients with 
schizophrenia (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; Happe, 2003; Bora et aI., 2007; Langdon & 
Ward, 2009). Empirical associations have not yet been established between Tom and 
awareness in other clinical samples with notable deficits in both domains (e.g. patients 
with fvFTD), though such links are strongly suggested by extant literature (Gregory et aI., 
2002; Neary et aI., 1998). ToM and awareness are also thought to share overlapping 
neural substrates (Saxe et aI., 2006; Vogeley et aI., 2001), which suggests that damage to 
brain areas that impact ToM performance may also impact awareness, even in 
community-dwelling older adults without dementia. 
The results from the current study indicated that the primary participants 
demonstrated very good awareness on average (Table 11). Significant associations were 
found between primary participant ratings of memory and working memory function and 
actual performance on cognitive testing. Thus, evidence for impaired awareness was 
lacking in the current sample. Importantly, the excellent accuracy of the primary 
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participants in the current study differentiates them from clinical samples that 
demonstrate overall poor awareness and greater variability on awareness measures 
(Eslinger et aI, 2005; Williamson, 2010). Although ToM impairment was noted in the 
current study, the lack of impairment in awareness may have limited the results. 
Similar to the discussion of social relations and ToM, clinical samples with noted 
deficits in both ToM and awareness may be the most likely populations to establish links 
between ToM and awareness. There are three main reasons why community-dwelling 
older adults may demonstrate ToM impairment without accompanying awareness 
deficits. First, ToM-specific deficits may be present, but ToM may not actually be 
required for awareness. Second, ToM may be required for awareness, but poor 
performance on ToM tests may reflect poor general cognitive functioning rather than 
specific deficits in ToM in community-dwelling older adults. Third, ToM tests may be 
detecting an underlying neurological process that has not yet impacted awareness, but 
will impact awareness in the future as the underlying changes progress. Continued 
research into the correlates of awareness as well as longitudinal study of ToM tests and 
awareness in community-dwelling older adults will help to clarify the relationship 
between these two constructs. 
The current study hypothesized that individuals performing more poorly on ToM 
tests would be more likely to overestimate their cognitive and social abilities, but very 
limited support was found for the hypothesis. The extant literature suggests that 
overestimation of abilities is more common in older adult clinical samples that 
demonstrate ToM-specific deficits and also may be more clinically relevant with regard 
to safety and caregiver distress (Banks & Weintraub, 2008; Souchay et aI., 2003; Rankin 
et aI., 2005, Rymer et aI., 2002). In the current study, ToM impairment (FP 
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REJECTIONS) approached significance (p = .052) with regard to its ability to predict 
online-monitoring of memory performance (HVL T -R Postdiction Awareness), with the 
impaired group overestimating their performance compared to the non-impaired group. 
Postdiction measures of awareness are thought to tap online monitoring ability. 
The fact that a postdiction measure of awareness came closest to demonstrating the 
hypothesized relationship between ToM and awareness in the current study is important 
in the context of mounting evidence that postdiction measures have been found to 
demonstrate the greatest utility in capturing the gross awareness deficits exhibited by 
patients with fvFTD (Eslinger et aI., 2005; O'Keeffe et aI., 2007). O'Keeffe and 
associates (2007) found that patients with FTD demonstrated significantly less 
adjustment in their ratings following performance compared to other clinical older adult 
groups (corticobasal degeneration, progressive supranuclear palsy), though all groups 
demonstrated unawareness on some measures compared to controls. Additionally, while 
patients with AD may demonstrate unawareness, they appear to adjust their postdiction 
ratings according to their actual performance (Stewart et aI., 2010). For example, one 
study found that participants with AD overestimated their performance on a cognitive 
task before the task and 1 hour after the task, but were able to provide accurate estimates 
immediately after the task, consistent with intact online monitoring (Stewart et aI., 2010). 
Evidence that patients with fvFTD may demonstrate greater difficulties with online 
monitoring compared to other clinically impaired older adults groups combined with the 
current findings (i.e., association between online monitoring of memory awareness and 
ToM) suggests that future research should focus on possible associations between ToM 
and online monitoring measures of awareness. 
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Although poorer ToM performance was expected to predict overestimation, the 
results ofthe current study surprisingly indicated that ToM also predicted 
underestimation. Two significant associations were found that suggested that poorer 
ToM ability was associated with underestimation of memory and working memory. This 
finding is based on two different types of awareness measurement: an informant-based 
measure of awareness (MARS-MFS Awareness) and a performance-based measure of 
awareness (LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness). 
While extant studies have not suggested that lower levels of ToM ability should 
be associated with underestimation, healthy controls have been found to underestimate 
their positive qualities (Rankin, 2005). Other studies have found that cognitive 
complaints or underestimation of performance were related to mood and general mental 
health factors (Okonkwo et aI., 2008; Cargin et aI., 2008), though no evidence was found 
for this in the current sample, which may be related to the relatively low rates of 
depressive symptoms. 
One problem in drawing the conclusion that ToM may predict underestimation in 
older adults is that much of the evidence relies on informant-based ratings of awareness, 
which may have dubious accuracy. In the current study, the informants' ratings of 
primary participants' memory abilities were not significantly correlated with primary 
participants' actual performance on cognitive testing, but the primary participants' self-
ratings of memory were significantly correlated with actual memory performance. This 
suggests that the primary participants may have provided more accurate estimates than 
the informants on the MARS-MFS awareness measure. This would imply that the 
negative discrepancy scores that were obtained between informants' ratings and primary 
71 
participants' ratings were produced by informants' overestimating primary participants' 
memory ability. 
Problems with the accuracy of informant reports have been noted across the 
awareness literature (see review, Clare, 2004; Okwonko et aI., 2008). For example, in a 
study of financial capacity comparing patients with Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) 
and healthy controls, 31.9% of the MCI patients' informants overestimated the patients' 
ability (Okwonko et aI., 2008). Research has suggested that accuracy of informant 
ratings may depend on whether the informant resides with the primary participant, the 
type of relationship between the informant and primary participant, the informant's 
cognitive ability, and how disturbed the informant is by primary participant behavior 
(Clare, 2004; Ready, 2004). In the current study, primary participants and informants 
knew one another for a long time and saw one another frequently, but only 27.3% of the 
primary participants and informants lived together. Thus, it is possible that poor 
informant accuracy in the current study may be related to inadequate proximity or 
frequency of contact with informants and that very close proximity is necessary for 
accurate informant ratings in community-dwelling older adults. The need for proximity 
may be more important with community-dwelling older adults compared to clinical 
samples because community-dwelling older adults are typically not impaired and any 
cognitive difficulties that they exhibit on testing or in their daily lives may be more subtle 
and related to other factors (i.e. illness, fatigue, depression, etc.). Future studies of 
awareness may demonstrate better accuracy in informant ratings by limiting who can 
serve in the informant role and by including factors such as informant cognitive 
functioning and disturbance measures into study designs. Additionally, more research 
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regarding what factors contribute to informant accuracy would likely help both clinicians 
and researchers. 
The findings regarding underestimation and ToM also appeared to be influenced 
by ethnicity, as the association between memory awareness (MARS-MFS Awareness) 
and the FP Composite score was no longer significant when African-American and 
Hispanic participants were removed from the analysis. While the loss of statistical 
significance may be attributable to a loss of power resulting from the decreased sample 
size, the role of ethnicity is highlighted by the finding that the association of 
underestimation of working memory and poorer ToM performance was only significant 
when the African-American and Hispanic participants were removed from the analysis. 
As ethnicity was only associated with the FP Composite and was not associated with 
either of the awareness variables, it is likely that the changes in the significant 
associations may be related to variability in the Faux Pas Test that is associated with 
ethnicity, which will be discussed further below. 
Clinical Application a/ToM Tests 
In general, more normative data is needed if ToM tests are to be used for clinical 
purposes. The finding of impairment on the ToM measures in this community sample is 
particularly relevant in that both of the ToM measures included in the current study have 
been recommended as part of a larger neuropsychological testing battery for detecting 
executive and social deficits in early frontotemporal dementia (Torralva et aI., 2009). 
The clinical research essentially suggests that healthy patients will perform at ceiling or 
at least consistently above impairment levels on ToM measures, but this was not the case 
in this relatively high functioning community sample of older adults. 
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As noted above, the lack of strong support for the hypotheses regarding ToM, 
awareness, and social functioning may be related to a lack of ToM-specific impairment in 
community-dwelling older adults or confounds introduced by variability in general 
cognitive processes. An absence of ToM-specific impairment in community-dwelling 
older adults may suggest that ToM as a construct has limited validity and usefulness for 
predicting social functioning and awareness in this population. As noted in the 
introduction to this paper, the phenomenon of poorer ToM performance in community-
dwelling older adults compared to younger adults has been attributed by some authors to 
problems with general cognitive processes, such as memory and executive functioning, 
rather than a specific deficit in ToM (McKinnon & Moscovich, 2007; German & 
Hehman, 2006). The current study provides mixed support regarding the role of general 
cognitive processes with ToM, as the EYES test was highly correlated with cognitive 
measures but the Faux Pas Test was not. However, when impairment across the Faux Pas 
indices was considered, the impaired group demonstrated significantly lower levels of 
frontal lobe functioning and estimates of verbal IQ, suggesting that these factors likely 
contributed to impaired scores in some participants. The results suggest that general 
cognitive processes were likely involved in impairment on both ToM measures in the 
current study. Thus, future research is needed to ascertain the contribution of general 
cognitive processes in older adult ToM performance on advanced ToM measures and to 
guide improvements to ToM tests in order to increase specificity for ToM impairment. 
A final issue that relates to using ToM measures in clinical work with older 
adults regards the association between ethnicity and the Faux Pas Test. African-
Americans in the current sample were overrepresented in the impairment category on the 
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Faux Pas Composite score, with 80% of African-Americans performing in the impaired 
range compared to 27.7% of Non-Hispanic Whites performing in the impaired range. 
This may be because Faux Pas performance was associated with the lower ratings of 
health, slightly lower verbal IQ scores (approached significance), or lower levels of 
education (approached significance) in the African-American group compared to the non-
Hispanic White group. Although there is very little literature about African-American 
performance on ToM tests, one study of low-income preschoolers found that European 
children outperformed African-American children on ToM tests (Curenton, 2004). This 
may reflect cultural differences, as what is considered a faux pas may vary across 
cultures, and explanations of faux pas may vary according to ethnic groups' sociocultural 
histories. This may reflect a bias in ToM tests toward European cultural norms. Studies 
with the Faux Pas Test in older adults have generally either not included African-
Americans or have not reported the ethnicities of their participants (MacPherson et aI., 
2002; Stone et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007; Torralva et aI., 2009). 
In recognition of the importance of providing participants with culturally appropriate 
stimuli, Wang et aI. (2006) modified the stories in the Faux Pas Test for use with Chinese 
participants. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Several limitations and future directions for research have already been discussed, 
but there are others that must be noted. First, the sample was healthy, relatively 
financially well-off, and more educated than the general population (United States 
Census Bureau, 2011). These factors were relevant for several reasons. Lower vascular 
risk predicts lower rates of small vessel brain disease and other damage to neural circuitry 
(Knopman et aI., 2011), higher levels of education are believed to increase cognitive 
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reserve (see review, Stem, 2002), and greater income may increase access to resources 
associated with better health (Ettner, 1996). Essentially, factors such as health, income, 
and education, which may impact underlying neural integrity, may have resulted in the 
current sample having better cognitive and social functioning compared to the majority of 
their same-age peers. Thus, the sample characteristics in the current study may impact 
the generalizability of the results. As discussed above, however, the finding of impaired 
performance on ToM measures is particularly relevant within the context of the sample's 
good health and general cognitive functioning. 
Although an effort was made to recruit a representative sample, lower income 
participants were less likely to participate. This may be related to general difficulties in 
recruiting some groups to participate in research, but also may have been related to the 
combination of the volunteer-basis of study participation, the need for an informant, and 
the relatively significant time commitment for participation. In the current study, the 
latter two issues were necessary in order to answer study questions, but future studies 
would likely benefit by paying participants for their time. 
The method that was used to compute awareness on the performance-based 
measures (HVLT-R and LN-Seq Prediction & Postdiction awareness measures) was 
similar to the method used in an existing study (Graham et ai., 2005), but collapsing the 
actual scores into broad ranges based on standard deviations may have contributed to a 
loss of critical variability in the awareness scores. In a methodological improvement in 
the awareness literature, Williamson et ai. (2010) provided brief education on normative 
distributions and percentiles to three groups: participants with frontotemporal dementia, 
participants with AD, and healthy controls. A graphic depiction of the normal curve, 
which depicted human figures, was presented to participants to use in providing estimates 
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of their functioning in different domains. Participants' estimates were then easily 
converted into percentile scores, and the difference between the actual performance 
percentile and the estimated percentile could be calculated. Notably, the percentile 
estimates were highly correlated with a verbal rating scale (poor, fair, good, etc.) similar 
to the scale used in the current study, which suggested that the percentile method was just 
as good as the verbal rating scales with regard to reliability of estimates. While more 
research is needed to further validate the percentile-estimate method, it appears 
promising, as it may increase the precision of awareness measurement without the 
dampening of variability that occurs when actual performance scores are collapsed into 
ranges. 
As noted above, awareness and ToM present measurement challenges, and there 
are other measures of these constructs available to researchers. Although the selected 
measures for the current study were chosen based on the strength of their empirical 
support, it is possible that other measures of these constructs would demonstrate the 
hypothesized results because other measures of these constructs may tap more relevant 
aspects or may have better clinical utility in older adults. Thus, future studies of ToM 
and awareness may wish to incorporate alternative measures of the constructs. 
Both Type I and Type II error must be considered with regard to interpreting 
results from the current study. With regard to Type I error, analyses in the current study 
involved multiple comparisons, but maintained an alpha level at .05. The choice to 
maintain alpha at .05 was based on the need to balance factors associated with Type I and 
Type II error, as well as a consideration of the relative novelty of the research. However, 
because of the high number of comparisons in the current study, there is a possibility that 
some of the significant associations were products of Type I error. Thus, replication of 
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the results will be important for establishing the reliability of the findings. Consideration 
of Type II error is particularly germane to the analyses of ToM and awareness, as the 
current study may have lacked power to detect differences as a result of the modest 
sample size. The suggested sample size based on power analyses combined with the 
finding of borderline significant correlations between ToM and awareness indicate that 
the study sample was likely too small to detect moderate effects. Slightly larger sample 
sizes may be necessary to detect potential associations between awareness and ToM in 
future studies. 
Although excellent interrater reliability was found on the Faux Pas Test, one 
possible explanation for the lower scores among the two questions related to faux pas 
understanding is that the raters were more strict than other researchers in their scoring of 
these questions. The scoring guidance available in the testing manual and throughout 
the literature appears slightly mixed and may indicate that researchers have approached 
Faux Pas Test scoring with varying degrees of adherence to the manual (Stone et aI., 
1998; Gregory et aI., 2002; Zalla et aI., 2009, MacPherson et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 
2007). Certainly, better standardization with regard to scoring the Faux Pas Test as well 
as better normative data for both EYES and the Faux Pas Test is required in order to meet 
clinical standards. 
In sum, the current study did not find a significant relationship between ToM and 
social relations and only found limited support for a relationship between ToM and 
awareness in community-dwelling older adults. As discussed above, the findings may 
have been impacted by confounds from general cognitive processes, limitations of the 
measures, and sample characteristics. Increased specificity of ToM measurement along 
with the establishment of normative data and standardized scoring criteria for ToM 
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measures will likely improve future studies involving ToM. Refinement of awareness 
measurement, observational measurement of social functioning, replication with larger 
samples, research in clinical samples, and research into the longitudinal relationship of 
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Table I 
Study (First author, yearl N(mean ag_e in years) ToM Test(& Other Tests 
Happe et aI., 1998 OA: 19 (9 men, 10 women; Strange Stories Test 
mean age = 73} 
Y A: 67 (33 men, 34 
women) (mean age = 21) 
Saltzman et aI., 2000* OA: 8 (3 male, 5 female; Strange Stories; Oroodles; Executive measures 
mean age = 71.61, SO = Spy Model Task; Knower/ 
9.42) Guesser Task 
Y A: 9 (3 male, 6 female; 
mean age = 20.87, SO = 
2.53) 
Main Results 
Interaction of age and story 
type (control & ToM) F(I, 
82) = 14.59, P < .001. 
Post-hoc comparisons 
reveal OA performed 
better on ToM stories than 
YA t(84) =4.18, p<.OOI. 
I) OA group and YA 
group had similar 
performance on all ToM 
tasks, with the exception of 
the Knower/Guesser task, 
on which the OA group 
performed significantly 
below the Y A group (t(9) 
= -2.330, p= .022). 2) The 
Knower/Guesser task was 
the most highly correlated 
with measures of executive 
functioning. 
Limits 
I) Older group had high 
education 12-18 years (m= 
14 years, 7 months) which 
may affect the 
generalizability of the 
results. 2) No measure of 
general intelligence. 3) 
Scores may have been 
confounded with memory 
as participants were not 
permitted to review 
vignettes. 
I) Small sample size. 2) 
The one measure that 
found age differences may 
rely heavily on executive 





Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
Maylor, 2002 VA: 25 (15 males, 10 Strange Stories + 3 new Speed, Vocabulary 
Experiment I females; mean age = 19, stories Intelligence measures 
SD = 3.7) 
YOA: 25 (9 males, 16 
females; mean age = 67.2, 
SD = 4.8) 
OOA: 25 (6 males, 19 
females; mean age = 81, 
SD = 3.3) 
Maylor, 2002 Experiment VA: 30 (14 males, 16 Strange Stories - no Vocabulary 
2 females; mean age = 21.2, memory load Speed; 
SD = 2.5) Executive function 
measures 
OA: 30 (13 males, 17 
females; mean age = 80.6, 
SD = 4.7) 
Main Results 
I) ANOV A found 
significant differences on 
ToM tasks with no 
memory load regarding 
age group (F(2, 72) = 
21.21, p<.OOO I). Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that 
Y A & YOA performed 
better on ToM tasks 
without a memory load 
than the OOA. 
2) ANOV A on ToM with 
memory load was 
significant F(2,72) = 9.52, 
P < .0005). Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that 
Y A performed better on 
tasks with a memory load 
than both OOA & YOA. 
I) Relationship between 
ToM and executive 
functioning was mediated 
by age. Relationship 
disappeared when age was 
partialled out. 2) 
ANCOV A using 
education, vocabulary, 
speed, executive 
functioning as covariates 
found an interaction 
between story type (control 
vs. ToM) and age: F(I,53) 
= 4.23, p<.05. 3) 
Crystallized ability 
markers, such as education 
and vocabulary, predicted 
ToM performance. 
Limits 
I) Use of stimuli that have 
not been validated. 
2) Control tasks may differ 
from ToM tasks regarding 
inference complexity. 
I) Only one measure of 
ToM was used. 2) Control 
tasks may differ from ToM 





Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
MacPherson, 2002 VA: 30 (15 men, 15 Faux Pas Task Executive tasks; Gambling 
women; mean age = 50.3, task, Emotion 
SD = 5.7) Identification task; 
memory tasks. 
MA: 30 (15 men, 15 
women; mean age = 50.3, 
SD = 5.7) 
OA: 30 (15 men, 15 
women; mean age = 69.9, 
SD = 5.5) 
Phillips, MacLean, & VA: 30 (II men, 19 Reading the Mind in the Measures of fluid and 
Allen, 2002 women; mean age = 29.9, Eyes Task crystallized intelligence, 
SD = 7.1) Empathy, Emotion 
Identification tasks 
OA: 30 (15 men, 15 
women; mean age = 69.2, 
SD = 6.1) 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004 VA: 24 (13M, IIW; mean Strange Stories; Measures of fluid and 
age = 30, SD = 7.5) Video Task crystallized intelligence. 
OA: 24 (8M, 16W; mean 
age = 73 years, SD = 6.0) 
'------ ----
Main Results 
The ToM task did not 
demonstrate age effects 
(MANCOVA, Wilk's A = 
.86, F(10,162) = 1.26, TJp2 
= .07.07. 
Age effect was found for 
emotion identification, but 
this effect disappeared 
when memory ability was 
used as a covariate. 
Y A performed 
significantly better on the 
ToM task after controlling 
for education and fluid and 
crystallized intelligence 
(F(I ,55) = 5.61, p< .05, TJ p 
2 
= .09). 
I) Y A performed 
significantly better than 
older adults on ToM 
stories (t(46) = 4.56, 
p<.OOI). 2) The effect of 
age x story type (ToM vs. 
control) disappeared when 
fluid abilities were 
controlled for F(I ,45) = 
2.49, p = .12. 
-- --
Limits 
I) Only one ToM task was 
used. 
I) Only one ToM measure 
was used. 2) Performance 
on this task may rely on 
visuospatial processes 
which may decline with 
age. 
I) Group differences on 
control stories almost 
significant t( 46) = 1.82, 
p<.08. Thus, with more 
power differences may be 
found, which would then 
indicate that older adults 
would demonstrate an age 
effect for both control and 
ToM conditions, and not 
just ToM. 2) Sample was 




Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
German & Hehman, 2006 Y A: 27 (9M 18F; mean New vignettes were Crystallized and fluid 
age = 19.51,SD=1.5I) created in which ToM and intelligence measures; 
the control condition were executive function 
OA: 20 (1M, 19F; mean more evenly matched. measures focusing on 
age = 78.22, SD = 8.27) response inhibition 
Wang & Su, 2006 Y A: 30 (26M, 4F; mean Strange Stories; Crystallized and fluid 
age = 69.93, SD = 3.73) Faux Pas stories(1 from intelligence measures; IQ 
Stone et al. 2003,2 newly 
OA: 30 (26M, 4F; mean constructed) 
age = 21.6, SD = 1.5) 
Main Results 
Performance on ToM tasks 
was not significantly 
different in Y A vs. OA 
groups F(I ,45) = 0.66, 
p>.05. 
OA demonstrated worse 
performance on the Faux 
Pas test than Y A (t(58) = -
2.25, p<.05, but no 
differences were found 
between the older and 
younger groups on the 
Strange stories. 
Limits I 
I ) The measures used were I 
created and were not 
piloted. Though they 
seemed to be I 
improvement, more studies I 
would be needed to 
determine their reliability 
and validity. 
2) Gender differences on 
the tasks would influence 
the generalizability of 
results. I 
I) Cultural norms (study 
was done in China. 2) 
Possibly invalid measures 
3) Memory may be 
confounded with 
performance as 
participants were not 
allowed to refer back to 
stories before answering 
questions. 4) Men may 
perform more poorly on 
ToM tasks than women, 
which would affect the 




Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
Uekermann, Channon, & Y A: 32 (12M, 10F; mean Joke Task Abbreviated TQ measures, 
Daum,2006 age = 24.15 , SO = 0.73). Depression, Executive 
measures 
MA: 29 (10 M, 19 F; mean 
age = 49 , SO = 0.96) 
OA: 26 (12M, 14F; mean 
age = 67.46, SO = 1.26) 
Keightley et a!., 2006 Y A: 30 (15M, 15F; mean Strange Stories Global Cognitive 
age = 25.7, SO = 5.1) Single Cartoon Task functioning, Vocabulary, 
working memory, fluency, 
OA: 30 (15M, 15F; mean selective attention and 
age = 72.5, SO = 7.8) inhibition, sequencing & 
visual search, memory, 
personality, emotion 
processing of faces and 
words, trait measures 
Main Results 
ANOV A demonstrated 
significant difference in 
ToM performance across 
groups (F(2,84) = 14.22, 
p< .000 I). Post hoc 
analyses demonstrated that 
the older adults group 
performed significantly 
worse on ToM tasks 
compared to both the Y A 
and MA groups. 
OA and Y A did not 
demonstrate ToM- specific 
differences on either ToM 
task, though they did 
perform more poorly on 
comprehension questions 
compared to Y A. 
Performance on ToM tasks 
was not predicted by 
personality in either young 
or old adults (Keightley et 
a!., 2006) 
Limits 
Possible cohort effects and 
clear ceiling effects for 
humor processing task. 
Only 8 ToM items were 
used (4 ToM cartoons, 4 
ToM stories) and a 
relatively small sample 
size was used. Both of 
these may have limited 
power to detect 
differences. 
\0 o ..-. 
Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, Y A: 12 (gender NI A; Vignettes including faux Deontic selection task; 
2007 mean age = 78.18, SD = pas, first-order ToM working memory tasks 
N/A) questions, and second-
order ToM questions. 
OA: 12 (genderN/A; mean 
age = 20.16, SD = N/A) 
Slessor, 2007 OA: 40 (15 male, 25 Strange Stories; Mill Hill Vocabulary Test 
female; mean age = 66.95, Videos Task; 
SD = 4.31) Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task 
Y A: 40 (12 male, 28 
female; mean age = 20.08, 
SD = 4.64) 
----- ------- - -- --- ---
Main Results 
OA performed worse than 
Y A only on second-order 
questions (F (I, II) = 1.96, 
p>.05), but not on first-
order questions (F (I, I J) = 
1.96, p>.05). 
Working memory supports 
ToM functioning. 
Age differences on verbal 
ToM for Strange Stories 
task: ANOVA 
demonstrated no effects of 
age on ToM F(I ,78)<1, TJp
2 
= .00. 
ANCOVA (controlling for 
vocabulary) on verbal 
ToM demonstrated effects 
of age: F(I, 77) = 11.24, 
p<.OI. 
Age differences were 
found for the visual tasks, 
but not between the ToM 
and control tasks. Across 
visual tasks, both age 
groups performed better on 
the ToM tasks than on the 
control tasks. 
Limits 
High education in OA 
group (M = 15.90 years of 
education) 
Created their own 
vignettes based on faux pas 
stories and strange stories. 
No non-ToM control 
condition, so the 
conclusion cannot be 
drawn that the deficits 
observed are specific ToM 
deficits; rather, they may 
be working memory 
deficits. 
OAs had superior 
vocabulary compared to 
YAs. 
Did not control for 
executive functioning. 
Control condition for 
visual tasks was to guess 
the age range of characters 
(40-50 years vs. 50-60 





Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
Bailey, 2008 OA: 49 (16 male, 33 Eyes task EQ (Empathy Quotient) 
female; mean age = 70.4, Questionnaire 
SD = 5.51) 
Pro social subscale of the 
Y A: 80 (23 male, 57 Social Functioning Scale. 
female; mean age = 20.8, 
SD = 1.13) 
------ ~ ---~ 
Main Results 
OA performed worse than 
Y A on EYES task t(l27) = 
7.61, d= 1.35) 
OA reported lower levels 
of cognitive empathy (but 
not affective empathy) 
compared to YA (t(127) = 
2.45, d= 0.44) 
OA reported lower levels 
of social participation 
compared to YA (t (127) = 
3.48, d= .62) 
Cognitive empathy (as 
measured by EQ) partially 
mediated relationship 
between age and social 
functioning. EYES did not 
demonstrate mediation 
between age and social 
functioning. 
Analysis of EYES test 
determined no difference 
in performance for OA vs. 
Y A on items of different 
emotional valence. 
Authors conclude age is 
associated with reduced 
capacity for cognitive 




Causality cannot be 








Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s) Other Tests 
Bailey & Henry, 2008 OA: 33 (J I male, 22 Reality-known video task Speed, memory, measures 
female); mean age = 72.2, (high inhibition of self- of inhibitory control 
SD = 5.56) perspective FB task) (Stroop test, Hayling 
Sentence Completion Test) 
VA: 36 (II male, 25 Reality Unknown video 
female; mean age = 19.5, task (low inhibition FB 
SD = 2.\0) task) 
EYES task 
Main Results 
OA performed worse on 
EYES test compared to 
YA t(67) = -4.38, d = 1.04) 
OA performed worse than 
Y A on high inhibition FB 
task 
OA demonstrated worse 
performance on high 
inhibition FB task 
compared to their 
performance on low 
inhibition FB task, while 
Y A demonstrated no 
differences in performance 
on the two tasks. 
Stroop task, but not 
Hayling task, mediated age 
and performance on high-
inhibition FB task. 
Hayling task, but not 
Stroop task, mediated age 










Study (First author, year) N (mean age in years) ToM Test(s). Other Tests 
Pardini, 2009 Y A (Young Adults): 30 Revised Eyes Test Inclusion criteria: MMSE 
(15 male, 15 female); Age > 27 and no errors on 
range = 20-25 years CLOX test. 
EMA (Early Middle Age) 
30 (15 male, 15 female); 
Age range = 45 - 55 years 
LMA (Late Middle Age) 
30 (16 males, 14 females); 
Age range = 55- 65 years 
OA (Old Age) 30 (13 
males, 17 females); Age 
range = 70-75 years 
Verdon, 2007 OA: N= 20 (8M,12F; Cartoon Task MMSE; Verbal Memory 
mean age = 82, education Task 
level = 15 y) 
Y A: N=20 (9M, II F) 
mean age = 27, education 
16 y) 
OA = Older adults 
Y A = Younger Adults 
YOA = Young-old adults 
OOA = Old old adults 
WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
* Also included an additional group of 11 patients with Parkinson's disease; not reported in this table. 
**Also included an additional group of20 patients with Alzheimer's disease; not reported in this table. 
Main Results 
Significant age differences 
were found for ToM (F(3, 
116) = 24.5 
4 contrasts indicated 
poorer performance on 
EYES test for each older 
group: 
YA>LMA 
Y A> older adults 
EMA>LMA 
LMA>older adults 
Performance on ToM tasks 
was not significantly 
different in Y A vs. OA 
groups. 
Limits 
No other variables known 
to influence ToM were 
used as controls. 
Cross-sectional study; 
cohort effects could be 
influencing data. 
I) Expressive language 
abilities were not tested, 
but are an important 
element of test 
performance on the 
cartoon task used. 3) 
Depression, anxiety, and 
psychotic disorders were 
excluded. Exclusions may 





Effect sizes regarding ToM and different social variables 
Sample characteristics & Social Construct( s) Effect Size N 
reference 
Schizophrenia Overall Social Functioning r= .46 50 
(Bora et aI., 2006) Interpersonal Communication r= .49 
Schizophrenia Problematic Social Behaviors r = -.69 38 
(Brune et aI., 2007) 
College Students social skills r= .27 103 
(Baron-Cohen et aI., communicative abilities r= .25 
2001) 
6-year-old children, Social skills as rated by r= .35 26 
normally developing teachers 
(Watson et aI., 1999) 
Table 3 
---.J;;;;L 
Meaning of HIGHER 
TRANSFORMED scores for 
Abbreviation/Label Full Name/Description subsequent analyses 
AD Alzheimer's disease 
ADLs Activities of daily living 
AS Asperger's Syndrome 
CMI Charlson Comorbidity Index Lower levels of medical 
comorbidityb, h 
Convoy Convoy Measure Larger social networks f 
DRS-2 Dementia Rating Scale - Version 2 
EYES Reading the Eyes in the Mind Test-Revised Lower ToM abilitya, e, f N 
FAB Frontal Assessment Battery Poorer frontal lobe functioninga, f 
FP Composite Faux Pas Test Composite Lower ToM abilitl' e, f 
FP HITS Faux Pas Test Hits (correctly identifying a story with a 
faux pas as containing a faux pas) 
FP REJECTIONS Faux Pas Test Rejections (correctly identifying stories 
without a faux pas as not containing a faux pas) 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
fvFTD Frontal variant frontotemporal dementia 
GDS Geriatric Depression Scale More depressive symptomsb,d, g 
HVLT-R Hopkins Verbal Learning Test - Revised 
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness Discrepancy between predicted performance on the 
HVLT -R and actual performance 
-_._- -
Meaning of HIGHER 
TRANSFORMED scores for 
Abbreviation/Label Full Name/Description subsequent analyses 
HVL T -R Postdiction Awareness Discrepancy between postdicted performance on the 
HVL T -R and actual performance 
HVL T -R Delayed Recall Hopkins Verbal Learning Test - Revised, Delayed Poorer memorl' f 
Recall 
IADLs Instrumental Activities of Daily Living 
ISEL Interpersonal Support Evaluation List-Short Form Lower level of social supporta, g 
LN-Seq Letter-Number Sequencing subtest 
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness Discrepancy between predicted performance on LN-
Seq and actual performance 
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness Discrepancy between postdicted performance on LN- M 
Seq and actual performance 
MARS-MFS Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory Awareness 
Rating Scale - Revised. 
MARS-MFS Awareness Discrepancy between informant and primary participant 
ratings of primary participant memory on the MARS-
MFS 
MARS-MFS Informant Ratings Informant Ratings of Primary Participant's memory on Lower levels of memory in the 
the MARS-MFS primary participanta, f 
MARS-MFS Primary Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory Awareness 
Participant Ratings Rating Scale - Revised, Primary participants' self-
report of memory 
Mel Mild Cognitive Impairment 
NAART North American Adult Reading Test 
- --- -- -- -
Abbreviation/Label Full Name/Description 
PANSE-NSE Positive and Negative Social Exchange measure -
Negative Social Exchange subscale 
PD Parkinson's disease 
PP Primary Participant 
prSFS Peer Report Social Functioning Scale - the informant 
ratings of primary participant social functioning 
prSFS awareness score Discrepancy between primary participant & Informant 
ratings of primary participant social functioning on the 
Peer Report Social Functioning Scale 
prSFS primary participant Primary participant's self-report of their social 
rating functioning on the Peer Report Social Functioning 
Scale 
SST Socioemotional Selectivity Theory 
ToM Theory of Mind 
Vascular Risk Vascular Risk 
Visual Acuity Visual Acuity 
--- ----
a Required a preliminary linear transformation to reverse skew from negative to positive. 
b Required a preliminary linear transformation to make all scores positive. 
c 100% correct group versus less than 100% correct group. 
dtranformation completed on both primary participant and informant scores 
--
Meaning of HIGHER 
TRANSFORMED scores for 
subsequent analyses 
Greater frequency of negative social 
exchangesf 
Lower levels of social functioning a, 
f 
Lower levels of awareness & 
overestimation of social 
functioningb, f 
Higher levels of vascular riskb,f 
Bett~r visual acuitl,h 
eNote that the raw score, in which higher scores indicate better ToM, was usedfor comparison with extant studies 
j Square Root transformation 
gNatural Log transformation 
h Reciprocal transformation 
-.:t ...... 
Table 4 
Characteristics of Primary Participants and Informants 
Characteristic Primary Participants Informants 
Age (years) Mean = 68.79 (SO = 7.75) Mean = 59.33 
(SO = 15.77t 
Gender 
Male 23 (29.5%) 18(23.1%) 
Female 55 (70.5) 59 (75.6%) 
Ethnicity 
Non-Hispanic White 72 (92.3%) 69 (88.5%) 
African American 5 (6.4%) 6 (7.7%) 
Hispanic 1 (l.3%) 2 (2.6%) 
Education 
Less than 12th grade 1 (l.3%) 3 (3.9%)b 
High School graduate (or GED) 6 (7.7%) 8 (10.4%) 
Partial College/Specialized 27 (34.6%) 25 (32.5%) 
Training 
College Graduate 16 (20.5%) 21 (27.3%) 
Graduate Training 28 (35.9%) 20 (26.0%) 
Marital Status 
Married/Partnered 34 (43.6%) 36 (47.4%t 
Not Married 44 (56.4%) 40 (52.6%) 
Employment Status 
Employed 31 (39.8%) 40 (52.0%)b 
Retired/Unemployed 47 (60.2%) 37 (48.0%) 
Income 
<$20,000 12 (17.9%)C 10 (15.2%)d 
$20,000-$59,999 27 (40.3%) 29 (43.9%) 
~$60,000 28 (4l.8%) 27 (40.9%) 
Health Self-Rating 
Poor or Fair 9 (1l.5%) 9 (1l.8%)a 
Good, Very Good, or Excellent 69 (88.5%) 67 (88.2%) 
aData available for 76 informants; bData available for 77 informants; 
CData available for 67 primary participants; dData available for 66 informants 
115 
Table 5 
Cognitive variables - Means and 95% confidence intervals (or standard deviations) 
Construct Measure 
VerbalIQ NAART C 
Global Cognitive Functioning DRS-2 Total Scaled 
Scoree 
(DRS-2 Total raw 
score) 
Memory HVL T -R Delayed 
Recall T -Scored 
Frontal lobe functioning FAB Total T-Scored 
Working Memory Letter-Number 
Sequencing Total T-
Scored 
aNot reportedfor transformed variables 
b Based on transformed score 
cStandard Score (mean = 100, standard deviation = 15) 
dr-score (mean = 50, standard deviation = 10) 
















105.51 - 110.24 
10.62 - 11.72 
137.31-139.57 
52.92 - 57.97 
57.16 - 61.43 
53.88 - 58.09 
\0 
Table 6 
Characteristics Regarding the Relationships of Primary Participants and Informantsa 
Characteristic 






Duration of the Informants' Relationship 
with Primary Participants in years 
Frequency of Informants seeing/talking 
with Primary Participants 
Lives with Primary Participant 
Daily 
Several Times per Week 
Once a week - monthly 














EYES Test - Mean EYES Test scores in Recent Studies with older adults 
Study n Mean age (SD) Mean Standard 95% 
Deviationa Confidence 
Interval 
Current Study 78 68.8 (7.75) 25.95 24.8. 26.9 
(non-transformed 78 68.8 (7.75) 25.41 4.7 
data) 
Bailey et al., 2008 49 70.4 (5.5) 21.2 6.3 
Bailey & Henry, 2008 33 72.2 (5.6) 23.4 3.8 
00 -
Pardini et aI., 2009b 30 b 21.6 2.2 
a Not reported for transformed variables 
bparticipants' ages rangedfrom 70-75 years 
Table 8 
Faux Pas Test Composite, FP HITS, and FP REJECTIONS scores in recent studies with older adults without clinical diagnosis 
Study n Mean age Measure Mean (SDa) 95% 
(SD) Confidence 
Interval 
Current Study 78 68.8 (7.75) FP Composite 33.3 32.4 - 34.1 
Score 
FP Composite 0.82 (0.09) 0.80 -0.84 
Score 
Proportionb 
FP HITS 0.96 (0.08) 
Proportion 
FP 0.94 (.1) 
0"1 
REJECTIONS ...... ...... 
Proportion 
Gregory et aI., 10 57.1 (5.1t FP Composite 0.94 (0.1) 
2002 Score Proportion 
FP HITS 0.95 (0.1) 
Proportion 
FP 0.99 (0.1) 
REJECTIONS 
Torralva et aI., 10 63.5 (5.8) 
Proportion 
FP HITS 9.3 (0.9)d 
2007 Score 
FP 9.7 (0.5)d 
REJECTIONS 
Score 
a Not reported for transformed variables, b Proportion score calculated in order to make comparisons with other studies, C Based on 
16 participants, although only 10 participated in Faux Pas Testing ;d Maximum possible score was 10 (as there are 10 stories) 
Table 9. 
Social Relations variables - Means and 95% confidence intervals 
Measure Possible n Mean-a - 95% Confidence Interval 
Score 
Range 
Convoy Theoretically 77 24.60 21.44 - 27.98 
Infinite 
PANSE-NSE 0-96 78 10.11 8.53 - 11.76 
ISEL 6 - 24 78 22.28 21.84 - 22.66 
prSFS 1 - 4 76 3.41 3.33 - 3.49 
a Based on transformed score 
Note: Convoy = measure of social network size 
PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchanges Measure - Negative Social Exchange subscale 
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form 




Correlations between Social Relations, Health, Demographics, and Depression 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Convoy -.02 -.43** 0 -.42** .18 .11 -.09 -.02 -.30** 
2. PANSE-NSE .33** .03 .02 -.16 -.20 -.08 0 .27* 
3. ISEL .17 .25* -.11 -.27* .06 .09 .38** 
4. PrSFS .24* -.16 -.20 .07 -.19 .24* 
5. Vascular Risk -.44** -.43** -.11 -.17 .21 
6. CMI .22 .11 -.08 -.06 
7. PP Health Self- .12 .21 -.48** 
Rating 
8. PP Age -.06 -.04 
9. PP Education .012 
10. PPGDS 
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ 
Note: Convoy = measure of social network size; PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchanges Measure - Negative Social 
Exchange subscale; ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form; prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale 
Vascular Risk = cumulative vascular risk score; CMf = Charlson Comorbidity Index; PP GDS = Primary Participant Geriatric 
Depression Scale score 
N 
Table 11 







~ARS- 76 -1.22 
~FS 
Awareness 





LN-Seq 77 -0.75 
Prediction 









aNot reported for transformed variables 
b Based on transformed score 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
(-3.37) - (+1.80) 
(-3.07) - (+0.63) 
(-0.48) - (+0.02) 
(-0.22) - (+0.19) 
(-0.94) - (-0.56) 
(-0.95) - (-0.47) 
n (%) under- n (%) 0 n (%) over-
estimating discrepancy estimating 
functioning functioning 
41 (53.9%) 3 (3.9%) 32 (42.2%) 
47 (61.8%) 3 (3.9%) 26 (34.3%) 
34 (43.6%) 25 (32.1 %) 19 (24.4%) 
24 (31.2%) 31 (40.3%) 22 (28.6%) 
49 (63.6%) 25 (32.5%) 3 (3.9%) 
47 (61.8%) 20 (26.3%) 9 (11.8%) 
Note: prSFS Awareness=Discrepancy between primary participant (PP) and informant (IN) ratings of PP social functioning on the 
prSFS 
MARS-MFS Awareness = Discrepancy between PP and IN ratings of PP memory on the MARS-MFS 
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between prediction and actual performance on HVLT-R Trial 1 
HVLT-R Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between prediction and actual performance on HVLT-R Total Recall 
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between prediction and actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing subtest 




Correlations between Awareness, Health, Demographics, and depression 
Measure 1. 2.a 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12 . 
1. PrSFS Awareness . 28* .06 .02 .11 .04 .26* -.18 -.11 -.04 -.04 .21 
2. MARS-MFS .03 -.02 .12 .13 .07 -.12 .04 -.11 .20 .14 
Awarenessa 
3. HVL T -R Prediction .43** .09 .18 .10 -.16 .07 -.11 .14 -.07 
Awareness 
4. HVL T -R Postdiction .18 .22 -.23b .03 0 .20 -.26* .21 
Awareness 
5. LN-Seq Prediction .65** .08 .07 0 -.03 0 -.09 
Awareness M 
N 
6. LN -Seq Postdiction .10 -.13 0 -.19 .11 -.15 ...... 
Awareness 
7. Vascular Risk -.44** -.43** -.11 -.17 .21 
8. eMI .22 .11 -.08 -.06 
9. PP Health Self- .12 .21 -.48** 
Rating 
10. PPAge -.06 -.04 
11. PP Education .012 
12. PPGDS 
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol; aBased on 76 pairs; bp = .05 
Table 13. 


















HVLT-R Trial! T 
score 
-.75** 
*Significant at p < .05; **Significant at p < .01 









Significant Mean Differences between Men and Women on the HVLT-R performance-based Awareness Measures 
Variable Statistic Mean for Males Mean for Females (SD) 
(SD) 
HVL T -R Prediction t(76) = -3.40, P < .01 0.41 (1.01) -0.49 (1.07) 
Awareness 





Significant Differences between the African-American group and the non-Hispanic White group 
Variable Statistic African-American mean (SD or Non-Hispanic White mean 
95% CI) {SD or 95% CI) 
FP Composite t (75) = -3.79, P < .001 26.71 95% CI [18.15, 33.27] 33.61 95% CI [32.83, 34.35] 
HVLT-R t (75) = -2.16, P = .03 0.80 (SO = 0.84) -0.28 (SO = 1.09) 
Prediction 
Awareness 
Health (self- t(75) = 2.11, P < .05 1.80 (SO = 1.30) 2.63 (SO = 0.81) 
rating) 
Education t (75) = 1.91, P = .06 3.00 (SO = 0.71) 3.90 (SO = 1.04) 
VerbalIQ t (75) = 1.92, p= .06 99.33 (SO = 9.61) 108. 55 (SO = 10.40) 
(NAART) \0 C'l 
Table 16. 
Correlations between ToM and Health Variables, Demographic and Depression 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. FP Composite .10 0 .24* -.15 .05 -.17 .05 
2. EYES .09 0 -.20 .33** -.19 -.09 
3. Vascular Risk -.44** -.43** -.11 -.17 .21 
4. CMI .22 .11 -.08 -.06 
5. PP Health Self-Rating .12 .21 -.48** 
6. PP Age -.06 -.04 
7. PP Education .012 
8. PP GDS 
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol 
Note: Vascular Risk = cumulative vascular risk score; CMI = Charlson Comorbidity Index; PP GDS = Primary Participant 




Correlations between ToM and Cognition 
Measure 
1. FP Composite 
2. EYES 
3. Visual Acuity 
4. NAART 
5. DRS-2 
6. HVL T -R Delayed 
Recall 
7. FAB 
8. LN- Seq 
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
.10 -.03 -.20 
-.27* -.42* 
.27* 
5. 6. 7. 8. 
-.16 .14 .15 -.19 
-.38** .23* .22 -.33** 
.15 -.14 -.05 .15 
.51 ** -.28* -.35** .583** 
00 
C"l ...... 




Correlations between Social Relations and Cognition 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Convoy -.02 -.43** 0 .13 .17 .28* -.33** -.11 .28* 
2. PANSE-NSE .33** .03 -.18 -.05 .03 -.08 .12 -.04 
3. ISEL .17 -.16 -.08 -.24* .07 .19 -.22 
4. prSFS -.13 -.03 -.07 -.27* .12 0 
5. Visual Acuity .27* .15 -.14 -.05 .15 
6. NAART .51 ** -.28* -.35** .58** 
7. DRS-2 -.40** -.34** .39** 
8. HVL T -R Delayed .26* -.35** 
Recall 
9. FAB -.33** 
10. LN-Seq 
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol 
Note: Convoy = measure of social network size; PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchanges Measure - Negative Social 




Correlations between Awareness and Cognition 
Measure 1. 2.a 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12 . 
1. prSFS Awareness .28* .06 .02 .11 .04 .05 .13 .09 -.19 .07 0 
2. MARS-MFS .03 -.02 .12 .13 .05 .17 -.07 -.14 .06 -.02 
Awarenessa 
3. HVLT-R .429** .09 .18 .05 -.05 -.23* .55** .31 ** -.07 
Prediction 
Awareness 




5. LN-Seq Prediction .65** .09 -.10 -.07 .11 .10 -.35** 
Awareness 
6. LN-Seq Postdiction .10 0 .03 .13 .10 -.31 ** 
Awareness 
7. Visual Acuity .27* .15 -.14 -.05 .15 
8. NAART .51 ** -.28* -.35** .58** 
9. DRS-2 -.40** -.34** .39** 
10. HVLT -R Delayed .26* -.35** 
Recall 
11. FAB -.33** 
12. LN-Seq 
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ, aBased on 76 pairs 
Table 20. 
Significant Mean Differences on Cognition between Impaired and Non-Impaired Groups, as measured by ToM tests 
ToM Measure Variable Statistic Mean for Impaired (SD or Mean for Non-Impaired 
of Impairment 95% CI) (SD or 95% CI) 
FP Composite Estimated Verbal t(76) = -2.49, p < .05 103.58 (11.09) 109.76 (9.72) 
IQ (NAART) 
EYES Estimated Verbal t(76) = -3.88, P < 95.35 (10.17) 109.31 (9.59) 
IQ (NAART) .001 




EYES Working t(75) = -2.86, p< .01 47.50 (8.83) 56.97 (8.86) 
Memory (LN-
Seq) 
EYES Frontal Lobe t(76) = 2.09, P < .05 51.72 (95% CI[39.47, 60.55]) 60.16 
Functioning (95% CI [57.90, 62.13]) 
(FAB Tscore) 
f 
FP Frontal Lobe t(76) = 2.19, P < .05 52.41 (95% CI[44.73, 58.56]) 60.29 
REJECTIONS Functioning (95% CI [57.96, 62.31]) 
(FAB Tscore) 
Table 21 
Correlations between ToM and Social Relations Variables 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. FP Composite .10 -.01 .05 -.01 -.08 
2. EYES -.10 .07 .11 0 
3. Convoy -.02 -.43** 0 
4. PANSE - NSE .33** .03 
5. ISEL .17 
6. prSFS 
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ 
Note: PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchange Measure - Negative Social Exchange subscale; 




Correlations between ToM and Awareness Variables 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4.a 
1. FP Composite .10 -.10 -.25* 
2. EYES -.14 -.15 
3. prSFS Awareness .28* 
4. MARS-MFS Awarenessa 
5. HVL T -R Prediction 
Awareness 
6. HVL T -R Postdiction 
Awareness 
7. LN Seq Prediction 
Awareness 
8. LN Seq Postdiction 
Awareness 
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ 


























Significant Mean Differences on Awareness Measures between Impaired and Non-Impaired Groups, as measured by ToM tests 
ToM Measure Awareness Statistic Mean for Impaired (SD or Mean for Non-Impaired 
of Impairment Variable 95% CI) (SD or 95% CI) 
FP Composite MARS-MFS t(74) = -2.18, P < .05 -4.22 (7.54) 0.08 (8.05) 
Awareness 
FP MARS-MFS t(74) = -3.09, P < .01 -8.20 (8.15) -0.17 (7.60) 
REJECTIONS Awareness 





EYES prSFS Awareness t(74) = -1.86, P = .068a -7.24 (95% CI[-15.98, -0.06 
5.09])b (95% CI[ -2.57, 2.70])b 




b transformed scores were converted back to raw scores for reporting of means and 95% confidence intervals 
Table 24 
Reference Table for significant relationships between ToM variables and selected study variables across analyses methods 
General Study Variable EYES EYES Faux Pas 
Construct Impairment Composite 








Depression GDS x 
Cognition NAART ** ** 
DRS-2 ** ** 
HVL T -R Delayed Recall * 
FAB x * 
LN-Seq ** ** 




Awareness MARS-MFS Awareness * 
I prSFS Awareness x 
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness 
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness x 
HVLT-R Postdiction Awareness 
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness *" 
Note: x = approached significance, * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at P < .01, 
"only significant when minority participants removed from analysis 
Faux Pas Faux Pas 
Composite REJECTION 









Model of relationship between ToM and social variables 
prSFS 
ISEL 
Note: EYES = Reading the EYES in the Mind - Revised score 
FP Composite Score = Faux Pas Composite score 
prSFS = Peer Report Social Functioning Scale 
PANSE-NSE 
Convoy 
PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchange measure - Negative Social 
Exchange subscale 
Convoy = Convoy Measure for social network size 
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form 
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Figure 2. 
Model of hypotheses related to ToM and awareness 
EYES 
prSFS Avvare _ 
FP Composite 
LN-Seq Post. A w are . 
Note: EYES = Reading the EYES in the Mind - Revised score 
FP Composite Score = Faux Pas Composite score 
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and 
actual performance on the Letter-Number Sequencing subtest 
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and actual 
performance on HVLT-R. 
MARS-MFS Awareness= Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant 
ratings of primary participant memory on MARS-MFS 
prSFS Awareness = Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant 
ratings of primary participant social functioning on prSFS. 
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and 
actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing 
HVLT-R Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and 
actual performance on HVLT-R. 
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Figure 3. 
Model of ToM and Social Relationsa 
. 15 
aBased on 75 participants and their informants 
Note: EYES = Reading the Eyes in the Mind Test 






prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS) Informant report 
PANSE-NSE = Negative Social Exchanges as measured by the Positive and 
Negative Social Exchange (PANSE) measure; 
Convoy = measure of social network size 
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form (ISEL) 
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Figure 4. 
Model a/ToM and Awarenessa 
.01 
LN-Seq Pred. A vvare. 
.0 4 
HVL T-R Prado Avvara . 
MARS-M FS Avvara. ~f---(83) 
14 
prSFS A vvare. 
aBased on 72 participants and their informants 
Note: EYES = Reading the EYES in the Mind - Revised score 
FP Composite Score = Faux Pas Composite score 
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and 
actual performance on the Letter-Number Sequencing subtest 
HVL T -R Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and actual 
performance on HVLT -R. 
MARS-MFS Awareness= Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant 
ratings of primary participant memory on MARS-MFS 
prSFS Awareness = Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant 
ratings of primary participant social functioning on prSFS. 
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and 
actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing 
HVL T -R Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and 
actual performance on HVL T -R. 
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